HomeMy Public PortalAboutPRR 16-236813:43:3310-31-2016 1 2 1 9343000807
1013112016 16:06 Commerce Group O:AU543800807 P.0021002
RECORDS REQUEST (the "Request')
Date of Request: 10/31/16
Requestor's Request ID#: 1321
REQUESTEE: Custodian of Records Sweetapple. Broeker & Varkes
Custodian of Records Jones. Foster, Johnston & Stubbs
Custodian of Records Town of Gulf Stream
Custodian of Records Richman Greer, P.A.
Custodian of Records Cole Scott & Kissane
Custodian of Records Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman, P.A.
REQUESTOR: Martin E. O'Boyle
REQUESTOR'S CONTACT INFORMATION: E -Mail: records@commerce-group.com
Fax: 954-360-0807 or Contact Records Custodian at records(dcommerce-group.com;
Phone: 954-360-7713; Address: 1280 West Newport Center Drive, Deerfield Beach, FL 33442
REQUEST: Provide conies of all records (including. without limitation, communications, billingL
memos, t t messages, emails. audio tapes and videos) wherein Scott Morgan was a Receiver
or a Sender during the Deriod March 1, 2015 through May 31, 2015 which are in possession of the
Town of Gulf Stream,
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING REQUEST: The term "Town of Gulf Stream" shall
mean each of the following: the Town of Gulf Stream, its Commissioners, its Manager, its emplovees, its
officers, its staff, its Police Department, its Police Officers its counsel and the following law firms:
Sweetapple Broeker & Var as: Richman Greer PA. Jones. Foster, Johnston & Stubbs: Cole. Scott &
Kissane. P.A.: and Johnson Ansel= Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman, P.A, (including, without
limitation, the attomeya, employees and partners of each such law firm.)
THIS REQUEST IS MADE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1, SECTION 24 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION AND CHAPTER 119,
FLORIDA STATUTES
IF THE PUBLIC RECORDS BEING SOUGHT ARE MAINTAINED BY YOUR AGENCY IN AN ELECTRONIC FORMAT PLEASE
PRODUCE THE RECORDS IN THE ORIGINAL ELECTRONIC FORMAT IN WHICH THEY WERE CREATED OR RECEIVED,
= 51 19.01(2)M, FLORIDA STATUTES. IF NOT AVAILABLE IN ELECTRONIC FORM, IT Is REQUESTED THAT THIS
RECORDS REQUEST BE FULFILLED ON 11 X 17 PAPER, NOTE: IN ALL CAM(UNLESS ]IMPOSSIBLE.) THE COPIES
SHOULD BE TWO SIDED AND SHOULD BE BILLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH Section 119&7(4) (a)(21
ALSO PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF 41207(1XH1 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTE& WHICH PROVIDES THAT "IF A CIVIL AMON
IS INSTITUTED WITHIN THE 30 -DAY PERIQD TO ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION WITH RESPECT TO
THE REQUESTED RECORD, THE CUSTODIAN OF PUBLIC RECORDS MAY NOT DISPOSE OF THE RECORD EXCEPT BY
ORDER OF A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION AFTER NOTICE TO ALL AFFECTED PARTIES."
IC COPIES ARE REOUESTED TO BE SENT BY E -
PLEASE PROVIDE THE APPROXIMATE COSTS (IF ANY) TO FULFILL THIS PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST IN ADVANCE.
It will be required that the Requestor appmve of any COS% asserted by the Agency (as dented In Florida Statute, Chapter 119.01
(Dentition)), In advance of any coats imposed to the Requestor by the Agency,
"BY FULFILLING THIS RECORDS REQUEST, THE AGENCY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE RESPONSIVE DOCUMENTS
ARE "PUBLIC RECORDS" AS DEFINED IN CHAPTER 119, FLORIDA STATUTES".
I/P/NP/FLRR 07.26.2015
TOWN OF GULF STREAM
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
Delivered via e-mail
December 21, 2016
Martin E. O'Boyle [mail to: recordsecommerce-group.coml
Re: GS #2368 (PRR 1321)
Provide copies of all records (including without limitation, communications, billings, memos,
text messages, emails, audio tapes and videos) wherein Scott Morgan was a Receiver or a
Sender during the period March 1, 2015 through May 31, 2015 which are in possession of the
Town of Gulf Stream.
Dear Martin E. O'Boyle [mail to: records(@,commerce-group.comj:
The Town of Gulf Stream has received your public records request dated October 31, 2016. You
should be able to view your original request and partial response at the following link:
httv://www2.gulf-stream.org/weblink/O/doc/I03401/PaizeI.aspx
The Town estimates that to fully respond to your request of "all records (including without
limitation, communications, billings, memos, text messages, emails, audio tapes and videos) will
require an additional two hours of administrative support at $35.60 per hour, the labor cost of the
personnel providing the service, per Fla. Stat. § I I9.07(4)(d).
If the costs of producing these documents will exceed your deposit, the Town will provide you
with an initial production of responsive records and an estimate for the production of any
additional responsive records. If the costs of production are less than the deposit, the Town will
provide you with the responsive records and a refund.
(Two hours @ 35.60) = Deposit Due: $71.20 in cash or check.
Upon receipt of your deposit, the Town will use its very best efforts to further respond to your
public records request in a reasonable amount of time. If we do not hear back from you within
30 days of this letter, we will consider this closed.
Sincerely,
Rpt Raw" $rte
As requested by Rita Taylor
Town Clerk, Custodian of the Records
Renee Basel
From: Homeless Coalition PBC<noreply@homelesscoalitionpbc.org>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2015 12:34 PM
To: Scott Morgan
Subject: Thank you for Giving!
Having trouble viewing this email? View online.
Please do not forward this email - share with a friend.
You are Great for Giving!
Dear Friends,
Thank you for supporting the Homeless Coalition during the Great Give 2015
Due to your generosity we raised $37,908 in 24 hours! We were number 7 out of the 437
organizations that participated in the 24 hour online giving event. Your donation will be used to
help fund homeless services in Palm Beach County.
The Great Give raised a total of $2.6 million for nonprofits in Palm Beach and Martin Counties.
Thanks to bonus funds from community organizations every donation goes even further.
Thank you also to everyone who attended the 4th Annual Senator Philip D. Lewis Center
Luncheon on May 6th. We know much of the our success during the Great Give came from the
guests who attended the event and purchased commemorative bricks.
Applaud yourself!
You are "Paving the Way to End Homelessness"
Renee Basel
From: scottmorgan75@gmail.com
Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2015 11:25 AM
To: Ingrid Bascobert;joconnor@jonesfoster.com; Bill Thrasher;
grichman@richmangreer.com; Eric Sodhi; Robert Sweetapple
Subject: Re: O'Hare/O'Boyle Public Records Requests
Thank you, Ingrid.
I forwarded your email to Eric.
This spreadsheet is interesting because it confirms a pattern of PRR activity. Using a 5 day work week and
removing holidays, these two men have, individually or through their agents, have maintained a fairly constant
stream of public records requests, averaging about 5 per day since September 2013.
Scott W. Morgan
(561)752-1936
From: Ingrid Bascobert
Sent: Thursday, March 05, 2015 11:04 AM
To: ioconnor(o)ionesfoster.com ; Bill Thrasher ; scottmorgan75Calgmail.com ; grichmanCalrichmangreer.com
Subject: O'Hare/O'Boyle Public Records Requests
Hello,
Attached is an excel spreadsheet of all the public records requests from O'Hare and O'Boyle from 2013-2015.
The excel doc includes a spreadsheet of each year (2013, 2014, 2015), as well as a spreadsheet with the total number of
requests, a spread sheet of high volume requests, and a spreadsheet of aliases used by both O'Hare and O'Boyle. I hope
this finds you well and that it is useful! Additonally, I do not have an email address for Mr. Eric Sohdi so I would greatly
appreciate it if one of you could forward this email to him. Thank you so much.
Regards,
INGRID B. BASCOBERT
Administrative Assistant
Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas, P.I
20 SE 3`d Street
Boca Raton, FL 33432
(561) 392-1230 (t) x. 306
(561) 394-6102 (f)
ibascobert(@sweetapplelaw.com
STATEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The information in this e-mail is confidential and may be legally privileged. If you are not the named addressee, or if this
message has been addressed to you in error, you are directed not to read, disclose, reproduce, distribute, disseminate,
maintain, save or otherwise use this email. Please contact the sender at the above number immediately. Delivery of this
message to any person other than the intended recipient(s) is not intended in any way to waive privilege or
confidentiality.
Renee Basel
From: Soule, Ali <ali.soule@allaboardflorida.com>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2015 3:07 PM
To: Scott Morgan
Cc: Bill Thrasher, Roberts, Russell
Subject: FW: All Aboard Florida - meeting request
Good afternoon, Mayor Morgan. I wanted to follow up on the email below. Please advise if you can meet with us next
Wednesday. We are available between 8:30a and 10a, and after 1:30 p.m. We would greatly appreciate the chance to
brief you on the project.
Ali Soule I All Aboard Florida
305.520.2105 1 ali_soule(aDallaboardflorida.com I www.allaboardflorida.com
From: Soule, Ali
Sent: Tuesday, April 28, 2015 10:55 AM
To: 'smorgan@gulf-stream.org'
Cc: Roberts, Russell (rusty. robertsCalfeci.com);
Subject: All Aboard Florida - meeting request
Mayor Morgan, good morning. We have been informed that you have expressed concerns regarding the All Aboard
Florida project. My colleague, Rusty Roberts, and I would appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and answer any
questions/address any concerns you may have. During this meeting, we can review our timeline, the quiet zone
partnership with the Palm Beach Metropolitan Planning Organization and outreach to emergency responders, plus
anything else you may wish to address.
Does next Wednesday, between 9a and noon or after 3p work?
We look forward to meeting with you.
Best, Ali
Ali Soule
Public Affairs Manager
All Aboard Florida
2855 Le Jeune Road 14th Floor
Coral Gables, FL 33134
T: 305.520.2105 1 C: 407.257.1838
ali.soule@allaboardflorida.com I allaboardflorida.com
Follow es: y' 11
A' LL ABOARD FLORIDA
1111= A W iOLLY OMED SUSSID/ARY OF
=9111 FLORIDA EAST COAST MOOS TRIES. LLC
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: The information contained in this transmission is privileged and confidential
information intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. No addressee should forward,
print, copy, or otherwise reproduce this message in any manner that would allow it to be viewed by any
individual not originally listed as a recipient. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are
hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, dissemination, distribution, copying of this transmission or the
taking of any action in reliance on the information herein is strictly prohibited. If you have received this
transmission in error, please immediately reply to sender that you have received this communication in error
and then delete it. Thank you.
Renee Basel
From:
scottmorgan75@gmail.com
Sent:
Monday, May 4, 2015 4:17 PM
To:
Bill Thrasher; Kelly Avery
Subject:
Decision- CAR v. Wantman Group
Attachments:
CAR v. Wantman Group Decision.pdf
Another victory for the good guys!
Note: Wantman Group is our co -plaintiff in the RICO case.
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIVIL DIVISION: Al
CASE NO.: 502014CA005771XXXXMB
CITIZENS AWARENESS FOUNDATION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
V.
WANTMAN GROUP INC.,
Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant Wantman Group Incorporated's
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on February 27, 2015. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in
opposition on March 26, 2015,1 and the Court heard argument on the matter on April 23, 2015.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. Defendant has a contract ("the Contract") with the South Florida Water Management
District ("the District").
2. Pursuant to the Contract, Defendant was to provide surveying and mapping services to
the District.
' Plaintiffs response also contained a cross-motion for summary judgment, which has not yet
been set for hearing and is not addressed in this Order.
3. Defendant is a contractor hired by the District.
4. Pursuant to Article 9.1 of the Contract, Defendant is an "independent consultant."
5. The District had no involvement in the creation of Defendant.
6. Defendant's financial goal is to receive compensation.
7. Plaintiff sent a purported public records request ("the Request") via email to an employee
of Defendant.
8. The Contract does not identify a custodian of public records for Defendant to whom
records requests should be sent.
9. Defendant's website, http://www.wantmangroup.com, does not identify a custodian of
public records for Defendant to whom records requests should be sent.
10. The Contract is signed by Robin Petzold in his capacity as Defendant's Senior Vice
President.
11. The Contract provides that notices thereunder should be sent to the attention of Robin
Petzold.
12. The Request was sent to "robin.petzold@wantmangroup.com.DidTheyReadIt.com."
Although Defendant does have a valid email address of
robin.petzold@wantmangroup.com, the email address to which the request was sent is
not a recognized email on Defendant's computer network.
13. The Request fails to identify any individual making the request, appearing to be from and
directing that a response be sent to vendor.contract.publishing@gmail.com. The name
associated with the email address was "An Onoma."
14. Mr. Petzold received the Request, but deleted it, believed it to be a spam or junk email.
Defendant believed the Request was illegitimate and spam and did not respond to it.
15. After suit was filed and Defendant became aware that the email was not intended to be
spam or junk mail, Defendant voluntarily produced the requested document to Plaintiff
through counsel while still preserving its objection that the Public Records Act did not
apply to it as a private entity under these circumstances.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment may be entered when it is shown that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled as to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.510(c). "The burden to conclusively prove the nonexistence of a material fact is on the
moving party." Cont'l Concrete, Inc. v. Lakes at La Paz III Ltd. P'ship, 758 So. 2d 1214, 1217
(Fla. 4th DCA 2000). "A material fact, for summary judgment purposes, is a fact that is essential
to the resolution of the legal questions raised in the case." Id. "It has been stated that the
movant's burden essentially amounts to `prov[ing] a negative."' Bernhardt v. Halikoytakis, 95
So. 3d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting Candler Holdings Ltd. I v. Watch Omega
Holdings, L.P., 947 So. 2d 1231, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)). "Only after this burden has been
met does the burden shift to the nonmoving party." Cont'l Concrete, 758 So. 2d at 1217. The
nonmoving party's burden is "to come forward with opposing evidence to show that a question
of material fact exists." Lenhal Realty, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., 615 So. 2d
207, 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). In sum, "[a] summary judgment should not be granted unless the
facts are so crystallized that nothing remains but questions of law." Craven v. TRG-Boynton
Beach, Ltd., 925 So. 2d 476, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citing 5haffran v. Holness, 93 So. 2d 94
(Fla. 1957)).
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND RULINGS
Defendant first seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether it, as a private entity, is
subject to the Public Records Act at all. Generally speaking, only those private entities which act
on behalf of a public agency are subject to the Public Records Act. See §§ 119.0701, 119.011(2),
Fla. Stat. (2014). The Florida Supreme Court has made clear that a private corporation does not
act "on behalf of a public agency merely by entering into a contract to provide professional
services to the agency. See News & Sun -Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural
Grp., /nc., 596 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 1992); see also Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 2014-06 (2014)
("[T]he nature and scope of the services provided by a private contractor determine whether he
or she is acting on behalf of an agency and would be subject to the requirements of the statute.").
The Court instead indicated that a "totality of factors" approach should be used in that situation,
and it set -forth a non-exclusive list of factors to consider.' /d. at 1031-32.
Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment based upon the "totality of
factors" in this case. Plaintiff points out that Defendant's Motion is silent on multiple factors in
the Schwab test, however, and Plaintiff further relies on the Contract itself to demonstrate that a
question of material fact exists on several of the other factors. Upon review, the Court concludes
that the record is not sufficiently crystallized with respect to the Schwab factors to warrant the
legal conclusion that Defendant was not acting on behalf of the District to avoid being subject to
the Public Records Act. The Court will thus assume arguendo that Defendant was subject to the
'- The factors considered include, but are not limited to: 1) the level of public funding; 2)
commingling of funds; 3) whether the activity was conducted on publicly owned property; 4)
whether services contracted for are an integral part of the public agency's chosen decision-
making process; 5) whether the private entity is performing a governmental function or a
function which the public agency otherwise would perform; 6) the extent of the public agency's
involvement with, regulation of, or control over the private entity; 7) whether the private entity
was created by the public agency; 8) whether the public agency has a substantial financial
interest in the private entity; and 9) for who's benefit the private entity is functioning.
Schwab, 596 So. 2d at 1031.
Act and turn to the second issue.
Defendant also seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether there was an unlawful
refusal pursuant to section 119.12, Florida Statutes. Where a civil action is filed against an
agency to enforce the provisions of the Public Records Act, the court is required to assess and
award the reasonable costs of enforcement, including attorney's fees, against the agency
responsible if it determines that the agency unlawfully refused to permit a public record to be
inspected or copied. § 119.12, Fla. Stat. (2014).
Here, Defendant ultimately fulfilled the Request, but not until after suit was filed. "Delay
cannot in itself create liability under section 119.12." Office of State Attorney for Thirteenth
Judicial Circuit of Florida v. Gonzalez, 953 So. 2d 759, 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). "Unlawful
refusal under section 119.12 includes not only affirmative refusal to produce records, but also
unjustified delay in producing them." Yasir v. Forman, 149 So. 3d 107, 108 (Fla. 4th DCA
2014) (quoting Lilker v. Suwannee Valley Transit Auth., 133 So.3d 654, 655-56 (Fla. 1st DCA
2014)). "Where delay is at issue, as here, the court must determine whether the delay was
justified under the facts of the particular case." Lilker, 74 So. 3d at 655 (citation omitted).
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has explained the trial court's task under section
119.12 as follows. The trial court should determine "whether a party had to file a civil action
against an agency to compel compliance." Althouse v. Pahn Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 92 So.
3d 899, 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Here, that is undisputedly the case, given Defendant's
testimony that it did not believe the Request was legitimate until the lawsuit was filed. "[I]f so,
if no reasonable or good faith belief existed to withhold such documents, then the court shall
assess reasonable costs of enforcement." Id. (emphasis omitted).
Whether a refusal to permit inspection was unreasonable and justified an award of
attorney's fees is a question of fact that may be determined on summary judgment. Cape Coral
Med. Ctr., Inc. v. News -Press Pub. Co., 390 So. 2d 1216, 1218 & n.5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
Similarly, "[w]hether a governmental entity acted in `good faith' in the manner in which it
responded to a request for disclosure of public records is necessarily a question for the court to
decide based on the circumstances of a case." Consumer Rights, LLC v. Union Cnty., Fla., No.
1D14-2653, 2015 WL 798087, at *3 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 26, 2015).
Here, Defendant contends that the delay in responding to the Request was justifiable and
thus did not amount to an unlawful refusal. Defendant primarily relies on a closely analogous
case, Consumer Rights. There, a public records request was sent from an email account bearing
the address ask4records@gmail.com. Consumer Rights, 2015 WL 798087 at *1. The request
was sent to an email address posted on Union County's website that was not associated with a
particular employee, UCBOCC@windstream.net. Id. Moreover, the request was made on behalf
of an unidentified "Florida company" and submitted by an unnamed agent of that company, and
it did not contain any information about how to contact the agent or corporation. Id. The email
provided that it was a "PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST" in capital letters. Id.
Four months after the email request was sent, Consumer Rights, LLC filed a public
records lawsuit against Union County. Id. at *2. After the lawsuit was filed, Union County
provided the records at issue. Id. On the issue of attorney's fees, the trial court heard testimony
from a county official, who explained that he did not respond to the request immediately because
it appeared to constitute "phishing," "a term that refers to a scam to dupe an email recipient into
revealing personal or confidential information that can later be used illicitly." Id. The trial court
ultimately concluded that Consumer Rights, LLC was not entitled to attorney's fees because
Union County's delay in providing the records was not tantamount to an unlawful refusal. Id.
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. Id. at *1, 5. The court concluded that the
record supported the trial court's conclusion that the county was justified in not immediately
responding to the email request. Id. at *3. In reaching its conclusion, the court expressly
acknowledged that "[t]he plaintiff was not required to identify himself in the request or to reveal
his reason for requesting the records." Id. at *4. Nevertheless, because the request "was made
by an unnamed agent for an undisclosed company" and "was sent to the county from an email
address that did not appear to be the address of a person," it "would lead anyone familiar with
the perils of email communication to exercise caution, if not to disregard the communication
entirely." Id. The court added that "the delay in this case could have been avoided altogether if
the plaintiff had just given the county a phone number or some other contact information that
could be associated with a person" Id.
We know of no law that requires a governmental entity to provide public records
to a generic email address, at least not until such time as it is made clear that the
address belongs to a person. If a generic email address were treated as the
equivalent of a "person" within the meaning of the constitution and the statute, an
unscrupulous computer hacker could bring the work of a government agency to a
halt by randomly generating a multiplicity of requests, all of which would require
a response, and in the process expose the agency to multiple attorney fee awards
for no good reason.
The county provided the records to the plaintiff soon after it learned that
the request had been made by person on behalf of a Florida corporation that did,
in fact, exist. We have no reason to believe that the county would not have
provided the records much sooner had it been able to verify the authenticity of the
plaintiffs email and thus we have no reason to question to trial court's conclusion
that the county acted in good faith. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
the delay in responding to the email was not tantamount to a refusal and that the
trial court correctly denied the plaintiffs request for attorney fees.
Id. at *4-5.
Consumer Rights is analogous with the instant case in all material respects. With respect
to the Request itself, the email was sent from an address that did not appear to belong to a
person, vendor.contract.publishing@gmail.com. The name associated with the account was "An
Onoma." While the email's subject line did state, "This is a public records request," there was
no indication in the email that the request was being made on behalf of a person or company, nor
did the email contain any information about how to contact the person or corporation making the
request.
Moreover, the email was sent to robin.petzold@wantmangroup.com.didtheyreadit.com.
Neither the underlying contract nor Defendant's website identifies Robin Petzold (or anyone
else) as a custodian of public records. Further, the "didtheyreadit.com" extension rendered the
email address one not recognized by Defendant's computer network. For these reasons, the
Request itself was one that "would lead anyone familiar with the perils of email communication
to exercise caution, if not to disregard the communication entirely." Consumer Rights, 2015 WL
798087 at *4.
The undisputed evidence in this case also confirms that Defendant acted in good faith and
that its delay in responding was attributable to the suspicious nature of the email. Defendant has
presented unrebutted affidavit testimony that it believed the Request to be illegitimate and spam
and for that reason did not respond to it. It provided additional affidavit testimony that it
voluntarily produced the requested document after the lawsuit was filed, when it realized that the
email was not intended to be spam or junk mail.
Plaintiff has presented no evidence which gives the Court "reason to believe that
[Defendant] would not have provided the records much sooner had it been able to verify the
authenticity of the plaintiffs email." Consumer Rights, 2015 WL 798087 at *5. Put another
way, Plaintiff presented no contradictory evidence to demonstrate the existence of an issue of
material fact with respect to Defendant's good faith. Indeed, the Court gave Plaintiffs counsel
the opportunity to point to record evidence that would demonstrate the existence of an issue of
material fact on Defendant's subjective good faith. Plaintiff's counsel conceded that there was
no such evidence and instead maintained the position that Defendant's good faith was
immaterial. As explained above, Defendant's good faith is not only material on the issue of
whether it unlawfully refused to respond to Plaintiffs request, it is dispositive.
For the foregoing reasons, there is no question of material fact with respect to whether
Defendant's delay in responding to Plaintiffs public records request was justifiable. As the
delay was justifiable, it did not amount to an unlawful refusal. Defendant is therefore entitled to
judgment as a matter of law with respect to whether there was an unlawful refusal for purposes
of section 119.12, Florida Statutes.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED IN PART with respect to whether Defendant unlawfully refused to provide public
records, but DENIED IN PART with respect to whether Defendant is subject to the Public
Records Act. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff takes nothing by this suit and
Defendant shall go hence without day. The Court reserves jurisdiction to adjudicate Defendant's
Motion for 57.105 Sanctions and to determine taxable costs.
DONE AND ORDERED in West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, on this 4th
day of May, 2015.
p�+pi � arnira�
•aoe, ereenee eenee or me corer
MEENU SASSER, CIRCUIT JUDGE
Copies furnished:
Daniel DeSouza, Esq.; DeSouza Law, P.A.; 1515 N. University Drive, Suite 209, Coral Springs,
FL 33071; ddesouza@desouzalaw.com; ddesouza@becker-poliakoff.com
Nick Taylor, Esq.; The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C.; 1286 West Newport Center Drive, Deerfield
Beach, FL 33442; ntaylor@oboylelaw£rm.com
Gerald Richman, Esq.; Leora B. Freire, Esq.; Richman Greer, P.A.; 250 Australian Avenue
South, Ste. 1504, West Palm Beach FL 33401; grichman@richmangreer.com;
Ifreire@richmanereer.com; dcostonis@richmangreer.com;
Renee Basel
From: Bill Thrasher
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2015 5:18 PM
To: scottmorgan75@gmail.com
Subject: RE: Decision- CAR v. Wantman Group
Great news.
Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE smartphone
-------- Original message --------
From: scottmorgan75@gmail.com
Date: 05/04/2015 4:24 PM (GMT -05:00)
To: Bill Thrasher <bthrasher@gulf-stream.org>, Kelly Avery <kavery@gulf-stream.org>
Subject: Decision- CAFI v. Wantman Group
Another victory for the good guys!
Note: Wantman Group is our co -plaintiff in the RICO case.
Renee Basel
From: scottmorgan75@gmail.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2015 11:59 AM
To: Garrett Ward; Bill Thrasher; dmr@wakayaperfection.com
Subject: Fw: 540 middle road
Chief,
See email below.
Please have an officer look into this matter for Mr. Roth.
Let's discuss how best to address this contractor's continuing violation of our construction rules.
Scott W. Morgan
1315 Neptune Dr.
Boynton Beach, FL 33426
(561) 752-1936
From: David Roth
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2015 10:32 AM
To: scottmorgan75Calgmail.com
Cc: gward()gulf-stream.org ; Anita
Subject: Re: Fw: 540 middle road
All - I am sitting on Middle Road unable to drive out to Polo due to the congestion of trucks. This is truly
unacceptable ... I will call the contractor now but wanted to advise of the situation.
Thank you:
-David Roth
On May 14, 2015 10:25 AM, <scottmorean75(a)email.com> wrote:
Chief,
Per our conversation this morning, I am forwarding David's email with attached photograph of trash and
debris at 540 Middle Rd.—this was at about 5:30 pm last night.
Would you please check the records of complaints and noticed violations on this project, and then give me a
call to discuss how best to address the ongoing nature of these problems?
Thank you.
Scott W. Morgan
1315 Neptune Dr.
Boynton Beach, FL 33426
(561) 752-1936
cell: 573-6006
From: David Roth
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2015 9:00 AM
To: scottmorgan75(dgmail.com
Cc: Anita
Subject. As discussed/540 middle road
Good morning Scott - thanks for taking my call. I sent you the attached photo via text as well - it was just a
quick photo I took last night before heading to the Town Meeting - but the situation is consistently thus and
often much worse with garbage, insulation etc. routinely blowing into our and the neighbors' yards. The
construction has been going on almost two years at 540 Middle Road, and has been nothing but a nightmare
for us all (Mrs. Hanson across the street was so grateful to me for being willing to contact you today since she
is also so upset but does not know what to do.) The problems have been numerous and we have called the
police at least twice when clouds of cement dust blew into our house twice in one week because they did not
rent a concrete sander with a vacuum bag (by the own admission of the contractor.)
Bottom line, you and I both know construction, and the project at 540 Middle Road has crossed so many lines
so many times that it calls our own enforcement procedures into question.
Thanks for your assistance, Scott - please advise what else you need (we have many photos!) The General
Contractor on the project is Counihan Construction at 561 722 6266.
Best,
-David Roth
539 Middle Road
David M. Roth
CEO
The Wakaya Group - Wellness Perfected!
www.wakayaperfection.com
www.wakava.com
+1310 384 2994
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David Roth <dmr@wakayaperfection.com>
Date: Wed, May 13, 2015 at 7:15 PM
Subject: 540 middle road
To: David Roth <dmr@wakayaperfection.com>
Renee Basel
From: scottmorgan75@gmail.com
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 11:27 AM
To: Robert Sweetapple; Joanne O'Connor; Bill Thrasher
Subject: Fw: O'Boyle Affidavit
Attachments: O'Boyle Affidavit.pdf
Attached please find the affidavit in resolution of the UPL complaints against JO.
The UPL committee discussions, negotiations and minutes are confidential so we will not have access to them.
The UPS committee made its decision in mid-May and so did not have an opportunity to review the recent
packet of documents that I submitted last week. I spoke with attorney Vazquez, who said she would read
those materials, although I suspect that is for personal edification, only. She emphasized that the matter is
now closed based upon JO's agreements as described in the affidavit.
Scott W. Morgan
1315 Neptune Dr.
Boynton Beach, FL 33426
(561) 752-1936
From: Algeisa M Vazauez-Pagano
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 11:09 AM
To: scottmoraan750)gmail.com
Cc: Diane Kinishi
Subject: O'Boyle Affidavit
Algeisa "Ali" Vazquez
Branch UPL Counsel
The Florida Bar
1300 Concord Terrace, Suite 130
Sunrise, Florida 33323
Tel. (954) 835-0233 ext. 4148
AVazquez@flabar.org
www.floridabar.org
Please note: Florida has very broad public records laws. Many written communications to or from The Florida Bar
regarding Bar business may be considered public records, which must be made available to anyone upon request. Your
e-mail communications may therefore be subject to public disclosure.
Please note: Florida has very broad public records laws. Many written communications to or from The Florida Bar
regarding Bar business may be considered public records, which must be made available to anyone upon request. Your
e-mail communications may therefore be subject to public disclosure.
AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHAN R. O'BOYLE
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF BROWARD
File No. 20151027(17C)
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, duly authorized to administer oaths, personally
appeared JONATHAN R. O'BOYLE, who after first being duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and
says as follows:
1. I am not a member of The Florida Bar and am not licensed to practice law in the
State of Florida. I am licensed to practice law in the States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
2. I permanently reside in the State of New Jersey.
3. I certify that 1 have read and will abide by the following decisions of the Supreme
Court of Florida: The Florida Bar v. Rapoport, 845 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2003); Chandris v.
I'anakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995); The Florida Bar v. Tate, 552 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1989);
The Florida Bar v. Kaiser, 397 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1981); The Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d
559 (Fla. 1978); State of Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962);
judgment vacated on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); and Rule 2.510, Florida Rules of
Judicial Administration; and Rule 4-5.5 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
4. 1 understand that it constitutes a contempt of the Supreme Court of Florida as well
as a third degree felony under the Florida Statutes for an unlicensed individual and/or business
entity to engage in the practice of law and/or hold himself/itself out as authorized to so practice
in the State of Florida.
5. 1 understand that it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for persons not
licensed to practice in Florida but licensed in other jurisdictions to either expressly or impliedly,
personally or by use of advertisement, hold themselves out as members of The Florida Bar and
generally authorized to practice law in Florida or able to render assistance with legal matters.
6. 1 understand that persons not licensed to practice in Florida but licensed in other
jurisdictions may not perform legal services or give legal advice to or for Florida residents on
matters of Florida substantive law unless otherwise authorized by court rule, case law,
administrative rule, or Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
7. 1 understand that persons not licensed to practice in Florida but licensed in other
jurisdictions may not advertise to the public either through the media, by telephone, by facsimile
or other direct solicitation that they are qualified and able to provide legal services in Florida or
relating to Florida law.
8. I understand that an attorney licensed in a state other than Florida may not appear
in any Florida state court as a representative of a party or otherwise participate in any Florida
litigation pending in State Court on behalf of any party unless admitted pro hoc vice pursuant to
the dictates of Rule 2.510 of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. I understand that as an
attorney licensed in a state other than Florida and being a resident of Florida, I am only eligible
to be admitted to practice before the state court pro hac vice in Florida if I have an application
pending for admission to The Florida Bar and have not previously been denied admission to The
Florida Bar.
9. I understand that once an interstate law firm has been established under the
dictates of Savitt, an out-of-state attorney's name may only appear on the letterhead and business
cards of the law firm if his jurisdictional limitations are clearly noted on the letterhead or
business cards indicating that the attorney is not authorized to practice in Florida.
10. I understand that it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for a Florida office
of an interstate law firm to operate without a partner admitted to practice law in Florida.
11. 1 understand that an out-of-state member of an interstate law firm may give advice
on the laws of jurisdictions other than Florida to non -Florida clients in transactions with persons
residing in Florida or with business enterprises having their principal place of business in Florida
provided that the nonmember of The Florida Bar giving the advice is in Florida on a transitory
basis and provided that a member of The Florida Bar handles matters involving Florida law. I
also understand that I may only engage in transitory professional activities that are incidental to
essentially out-of-state transactions and that I may only coordinate supervisory activities in
essentially multi -state transactions in which matters of Florida law are handled by members of
The Florida Bar. The Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1978) citing Appell v. Reiner,
43 N.J. 313, 205 A.2d 146 (1964) and In re the Estate of Waring, 47 N.J. 367, 221 A.2d 193
(1966).
12. 1 understand that an out-of-state member of an interstate law firm may give legal
advice concerning a right or obligation governed by federal law only if the lawyer is in Florida
on a transitory basis and it must initially be made clear to the client and immediately confirmed
in writing that the lawyer is not a member of The Florida Bar. The Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So.
2d 559 (Fla. 1978).
13. 1 understand that where there is a federal law or statute that specifically allows
practice before a federal office or agency, Florida continues to maintain control over the practice
of law within its borders except to the limited extent necessary for the accomplishment of the
federal objectives.
14. I, therefore, understand that as an attorney licensed in a state other than Florida, I
may not operate or maintain a law office in Florida, including but not limited to (a) maintaining a
law office in Florida as my primary physical business location; (b) performing legal services or
giving legal advice to or for Florida residents on matters of Florida substantive law; (c) acting as
a managing partner of a Florida law firm; and (d) exercising supervisory control over any
associate of the law firm who is a member of The Florida Bar with respect to matters involving
Florida law.
15. 1 further understand that as I am not a member of The Florida Bar, I may not
identify myself as the managing partner of The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C. with a Florida address.
I agree to discontinue use of any business cards, firm letterhead, advertisements, business cards,
retainer agreements, or any other forms or correspondences when using a Florida address and the
title attorney or attorney at law or any other similar title. I will include distinguishing limitations
indicating either that I am not a member of The Florida Bar or that I am only licensed to practice
law in the States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
16. I understand a Florida lawyer may be a member of an interstate law firm if the
relationship is a bona fide partnership in which the profits and losses of the several offices are
governed by a partnership agreement. As indicated in the shareholder agreement forming The
O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C., the parties intend to operate the interstate law firm in accordance with
all regulations in Florida and each requirement of Savitt. Accordingly, the profits and losses of
all offices of The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C. will be included in determining allocations, which
will not be based exclusively on the business generated or handled by the Florida office.
Specifically, The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.0 shareholder agreement will clearly delineate the name
of the member of The Florida Bar that serves as the Florida Managing Partner in Florida and
how the Florida Managing Partner shares in the firm's total profits and losses. I hereby
acknowledge that the current partnership agreement requires amendments in order to comply
with Savitt and therefore an Amended Partnership Agreement will be completed and provided to
The Florida Bar on or before by May 19, 2015.
17. I further understand that as an applicant for admission to The Florida Bar I may
not operate in the Florida office of an interstate law firm on a permanent basis in any manner
other than as a traditional law clerk under the direct supervision and control of a member of The
Florida Bar. I further understand that should my name appear on the letterhead of the Florida
office, the title law clerk or other similar nonlawyer title must appear after my name. As I may
only work as a law clerk if in the Florida office on a permanent basis, my name may not appear
in the name of the firm or be listed as an attorney for the Florida office of the law firm.
18. Until such time as I am admitted to practice law in Florida, I hereby agree to
provide a complete and signed copy of this Affidavit to any and all current and future Florida
Managing Partner(s) of The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C., as well as to current and future associate
attorneys and employees.
19. I understand that I am not admitting any wrongdoing and I agree that I will not
engage in any activity that constitutes the unlicensed practice of law in Florida unless and until I
am admitted to practice in this state by the Supreme Court of Florida.
O'BOYLE
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me on this, the 1 q-fdt day
of May, 2015 by JONATHAN R O'BOYLE, who is personally known to me or who has
produced N,T 7b L- as identification and who did take an oath.
1�7V"' " Notary Public
State of Florida at Large (Signature)
-Diane. Kinis'bti
(Printed or Typed Name)
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