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HomeMy Public PortalAboutPRR 16-236813:43:3310-31-2016 1 2 1 9343000807 1013112016 16:06 Commerce Group O:AU543800807 P.0021002 RECORDS REQUEST (the "Request') Date of Request: 10/31/16 Requestor's Request ID#: 1321 REQUESTEE: Custodian of Records Sweetapple. Broeker & Varkes Custodian of Records Jones. Foster, Johnston & Stubbs Custodian of Records Town of Gulf Stream Custodian of Records Richman Greer, P.A. Custodian of Records Cole Scott & Kissane Custodian of Records Johnson Anselmo Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman, P.A. REQUESTOR: Martin E. O'Boyle REQUESTOR'S CONTACT INFORMATION: E -Mail: records@commerce-group.com Fax: 954-360-0807 or Contact Records Custodian at records(dcommerce-group.com; Phone: 954-360-7713; Address: 1280 West Newport Center Drive, Deerfield Beach, FL 33442 REQUEST: Provide conies of all records (including. without limitation, communications, billingL memos, t t messages, emails. audio tapes and videos) wherein Scott Morgan was a Receiver or a Sender during the Deriod March 1, 2015 through May 31, 2015 which are in possession of the Town of Gulf Stream, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING REQUEST: The term "Town of Gulf Stream" shall mean each of the following: the Town of Gulf Stream, its Commissioners, its Manager, its emplovees, its officers, its staff, its Police Department, its Police Officers its counsel and the following law firms: Sweetapple Broeker & Var as: Richman Greer PA. Jones. Foster, Johnston & Stubbs: Cole. Scott & Kissane. P.A.: and Johnson Ansel= Murdoch Burke Piper & Hochman, P.A, (including, without limitation, the attomeya, employees and partners of each such law firm.) THIS REQUEST IS MADE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 1, SECTION 24 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION AND CHAPTER 119, FLORIDA STATUTES IF THE PUBLIC RECORDS BEING SOUGHT ARE MAINTAINED BY YOUR AGENCY IN AN ELECTRONIC FORMAT PLEASE PRODUCE THE RECORDS IN THE ORIGINAL ELECTRONIC FORMAT IN WHICH THEY WERE CREATED OR RECEIVED, = 51 19.01(2)M, FLORIDA STATUTES. IF NOT AVAILABLE IN ELECTRONIC FORM, IT Is REQUESTED THAT THIS RECORDS REQUEST BE FULFILLED ON 11 X 17 PAPER, NOTE: IN ALL CAM(UNLESS ]IMPOSSIBLE.) THE COPIES SHOULD BE TWO SIDED AND SHOULD BE BILLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH Section 119&7(4) (a)(21 ALSO PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF 41207(1XH1 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTE& WHICH PROVIDES THAT "IF A CIVIL AMON IS INSTITUTED WITHIN THE 30 -DAY PERIQD TO ENFORCE THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION WITH RESPECT TO THE REQUESTED RECORD, THE CUSTODIAN OF PUBLIC RECORDS MAY NOT DISPOSE OF THE RECORD EXCEPT BY ORDER OF A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION AFTER NOTICE TO ALL AFFECTED PARTIES." IC COPIES ARE REOUESTED TO BE SENT BY E - PLEASE PROVIDE THE APPROXIMATE COSTS (IF ANY) TO FULFILL THIS PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST IN ADVANCE. It will be required that the Requestor appmve of any COS% asserted by the Agency (as dented In Florida Statute, Chapter 119.01 (Dentition)), In advance of any coats imposed to the Requestor by the Agency, "BY FULFILLING THIS RECORDS REQUEST, THE AGENCY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE RESPONSIVE DOCUMENTS ARE "PUBLIC RECORDS" AS DEFINED IN CHAPTER 119, FLORIDA STATUTES". I/P/NP/FLRR 07.26.2015 TOWN OF GULF STREAM PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA Delivered via e-mail December 21, 2016 Martin E. O'Boyle [mail to: recordsecommerce-group.coml Re: GS #2368 (PRR 1321) Provide copies of all records (including without limitation, communications, billings, memos, text messages, emails, audio tapes and videos) wherein Scott Morgan was a Receiver or a Sender during the period March 1, 2015 through May 31, 2015 which are in possession of the Town of Gulf Stream. Dear Martin E. O'Boyle [mail to: records(@,commerce-group.comj: The Town of Gulf Stream has received your public records request dated October 31, 2016. You should be able to view your original request and partial response at the following link: httv://www2.gulf-stream.org/weblink/O/doc/I03401/PaizeI.aspx The Town estimates that to fully respond to your request of "all records (including without limitation, communications, billings, memos, text messages, emails, audio tapes and videos) will require an additional two hours of administrative support at $35.60 per hour, the labor cost of the personnel providing the service, per Fla. Stat. § I I9.07(4)(d). If the costs of producing these documents will exceed your deposit, the Town will provide you with an initial production of responsive records and an estimate for the production of any additional responsive records. If the costs of production are less than the deposit, the Town will provide you with the responsive records and a refund. (Two hours @ 35.60) = Deposit Due: $71.20 in cash or check. Upon receipt of your deposit, the Town will use its very best efforts to further respond to your public records request in a reasonable amount of time. If we do not hear back from you within 30 days of this letter, we will consider this closed. Sincerely, Rpt Raw" $rte As requested by Rita Taylor Town Clerk, Custodian of the Records Renee Basel From: Homeless Coalition PBC<noreply@homelesscoalitionpbc.org> Sent: Friday, May 8, 2015 12:34 PM To: Scott Morgan Subject: Thank you for Giving! Having trouble viewing this email? View online. Please do not forward this email - share with a friend. You are Great for Giving! Dear Friends, Thank you for supporting the Homeless Coalition during the Great Give 2015 Due to your generosity we raised $37,908 in 24 hours! We were number 7 out of the 437 organizations that participated in the 24 hour online giving event. Your donation will be used to help fund homeless services in Palm Beach County. The Great Give raised a total of $2.6 million for nonprofits in Palm Beach and Martin Counties. Thanks to bonus funds from community organizations every donation goes even further. Thank you also to everyone who attended the 4th Annual Senator Philip D. Lewis Center Luncheon on May 6th. We know much of the our success during the Great Give came from the guests who attended the event and purchased commemorative bricks. Applaud yourself! You are "Paving the Way to End Homelessness" Renee Basel From: scottmorgan75@gmail.com Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2015 11:25 AM To: Ingrid Bascobert;joconnor@jonesfoster.com; Bill Thrasher; grichman@richmangreer.com; Eric Sodhi; Robert Sweetapple Subject: Re: O'Hare/O'Boyle Public Records Requests Thank you, Ingrid. I forwarded your email to Eric. This spreadsheet is interesting because it confirms a pattern of PRR activity. Using a 5 day work week and removing holidays, these two men have, individually or through their agents, have maintained a fairly constant stream of public records requests, averaging about 5 per day since September 2013. Scott W. Morgan (561)752-1936 From: Ingrid Bascobert Sent: Thursday, March 05, 2015 11:04 AM To: ioconnor(o)ionesfoster.com ; Bill Thrasher ; scottmorgan75Calgmail.com ; grichmanCalrichmangreer.com Subject: O'Hare/O'Boyle Public Records Requests Hello, Attached is an excel spreadsheet of all the public records requests from O'Hare and O'Boyle from 2013-2015. The excel doc includes a spreadsheet of each year (2013, 2014, 2015), as well as a spreadsheet with the total number of requests, a spread sheet of high volume requests, and a spreadsheet of aliases used by both O'Hare and O'Boyle. I hope this finds you well and that it is useful! Additonally, I do not have an email address for Mr. Eric Sohdi so I would greatly appreciate it if one of you could forward this email to him. Thank you so much. Regards, INGRID B. BASCOBERT Administrative Assistant Sweetapple, Broeker & Varkas, P.I 20 SE 3`d Street Boca Raton, FL 33432 (561) 392-1230 (t) x. 306 (561) 394-6102 (f) ibascobert(@sweetapplelaw.com STATEMENT OF CONFIDENTIALITY The information in this e-mail is confidential and may be legally privileged. If you are not the named addressee, or if this message has been addressed to you in error, you are directed not to read, disclose, reproduce, distribute, disseminate, maintain, save or otherwise use this email. Please contact the sender at the above number immediately. Delivery of this message to any person other than the intended recipient(s) is not intended in any way to waive privilege or confidentiality. Renee Basel From: Soule, Ali <ali.soule@allaboardflorida.com> Sent: Friday, May 1, 2015 3:07 PM To: Scott Morgan Cc: Bill Thrasher, Roberts, Russell Subject: FW: All Aboard Florida - meeting request Good afternoon, Mayor Morgan. I wanted to follow up on the email below. Please advise if you can meet with us next Wednesday. We are available between 8:30a and 10a, and after 1:30 p.m. We would greatly appreciate the chance to brief you on the project. Ali Soule I All Aboard Florida 305.520.2105 1 ali_soule(aDallaboardflorida.com I www.allaboardflorida.com From: Soule, Ali Sent: Tuesday, April 28, 2015 10:55 AM To: 'smorgan@gulf-stream.org' Cc: Roberts, Russell (rusty. robertsCalfeci.com); Subject: All Aboard Florida - meeting request Mayor Morgan, good morning. We have been informed that you have expressed concerns regarding the All Aboard Florida project. My colleague, Rusty Roberts, and I would appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and answer any questions/address any concerns you may have. During this meeting, we can review our timeline, the quiet zone partnership with the Palm Beach Metropolitan Planning Organization and outreach to emergency responders, plus anything else you may wish to address. Does next Wednesday, between 9a and noon or after 3p work? We look forward to meeting with you. Best, Ali Ali Soule Public Affairs Manager All Aboard Florida 2855 Le Jeune Road 14th Floor Coral Gables, FL 33134 T: 305.520.2105 1 C: 407.257.1838 ali.soule@allaboardflorida.com I allaboardflorida.com Follow es: y' 11 A' LL ABOARD FLORIDA 1111= A W iOLLY OMED SUSSID/ARY OF =9111 FLORIDA EAST COAST MOOS TRIES. LLC CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: The information contained in this transmission is privileged and confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. No addressee should forward, print, copy, or otherwise reproduce this message in any manner that would allow it to be viewed by any individual not originally listed as a recipient. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any unauthorized disclosure, dissemination, distribution, copying of this transmission or the taking of any action in reliance on the information herein is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please immediately reply to sender that you have received this communication in error and then delete it. Thank you. Renee Basel From: scottmorgan75@gmail.com Sent: Monday, May 4, 2015 4:17 PM To: Bill Thrasher; Kelly Avery Subject: Decision- CAR v. Wantman Group Attachments: CAR v. Wantman Group Decision.pdf Another victory for the good guys! Note: Wantman Group is our co -plaintiff in the RICO case. IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVIL DIVISION: Al CASE NO.: 502014CA005771XXXXMB CITIZENS AWARENESS FOUNDATION, INC., Plaintiff, V. WANTMAN GROUP INC., Defendant. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant Wantman Group Incorporated's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on February 27, 2015. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on March 26, 2015,1 and the Court heard argument on the matter on April 23, 2015. UNDISPUTED FACTS 1. Defendant has a contract ("the Contract") with the South Florida Water Management District ("the District"). 2. Pursuant to the Contract, Defendant was to provide surveying and mapping services to the District. ' Plaintiffs response also contained a cross-motion for summary judgment, which has not yet been set for hearing and is not addressed in this Order. 3. Defendant is a contractor hired by the District. 4. Pursuant to Article 9.1 of the Contract, Defendant is an "independent consultant." 5. The District had no involvement in the creation of Defendant. 6. Defendant's financial goal is to receive compensation. 7. Plaintiff sent a purported public records request ("the Request") via email to an employee of Defendant. 8. The Contract does not identify a custodian of public records for Defendant to whom records requests should be sent. 9. Defendant's website, http://www.wantmangroup.com, does not identify a custodian of public records for Defendant to whom records requests should be sent. 10. The Contract is signed by Robin Petzold in his capacity as Defendant's Senior Vice President. 11. The Contract provides that notices thereunder should be sent to the attention of Robin Petzold. 12. The Request was sent to "robin.petzold@wantmangroup.com.DidTheyReadIt.com." Although Defendant does have a valid email address of robin.petzold@wantmangroup.com, the email address to which the request was sent is not a recognized email on Defendant's computer network. 13. The Request fails to identify any individual making the request, appearing to be from and directing that a response be sent to vendor.contract.publishing@gmail.com. The name associated with the email address was "An Onoma." 14. Mr. Petzold received the Request, but deleted it, believed it to be a spam or junk email. Defendant believed the Request was illegitimate and spam and did not respond to it. 15. After suit was filed and Defendant became aware that the email was not intended to be spam or junk mail, Defendant voluntarily produced the requested document to Plaintiff through counsel while still preserving its objection that the Public Records Act did not apply to it as a private entity under these circumstances. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD Summary judgment may be entered when it is shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled as to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c). "The burden to conclusively prove the nonexistence of a material fact is on the moving party." Cont'l Concrete, Inc. v. Lakes at La Paz III Ltd. P'ship, 758 So. 2d 1214, 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). "A material fact, for summary judgment purposes, is a fact that is essential to the resolution of the legal questions raised in the case." Id. "It has been stated that the movant's burden essentially amounts to `prov[ing] a negative."' Bernhardt v. Halikoytakis, 95 So. 3d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting Candler Holdings Ltd. I v. Watch Omega Holdings, L.P., 947 So. 2d 1231, 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)). "Only after this burden has been met does the burden shift to the nonmoving party." Cont'l Concrete, 758 So. 2d at 1217. The nonmoving party's burden is "to come forward with opposing evidence to show that a question of material fact exists." Lenhal Realty, Inc. v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., 615 So. 2d 207, 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). In sum, "[a] summary judgment should not be granted unless the facts are so crystallized that nothing remains but questions of law." Craven v. TRG-Boynton Beach, Ltd., 925 So. 2d 476, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citing 5haffran v. Holness, 93 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1957)). LEGAL ANALYSIS AND RULINGS Defendant first seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether it, as a private entity, is subject to the Public Records Act at all. Generally speaking, only those private entities which act on behalf of a public agency are subject to the Public Records Act. See §§ 119.0701, 119.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). The Florida Supreme Court has made clear that a private corporation does not act "on behalf of a public agency merely by entering into a contract to provide professional services to the agency. See News & Sun -Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twitty & Hanser Architectural Grp., /nc., 596 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 1992); see also Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 2014-06 (2014) ("[T]he nature and scope of the services provided by a private contractor determine whether he or she is acting on behalf of an agency and would be subject to the requirements of the statute."). The Court instead indicated that a "totality of factors" approach should be used in that situation, and it set -forth a non-exclusive list of factors to consider.' /d. at 1031-32. Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment based upon the "totality of factors" in this case. Plaintiff points out that Defendant's Motion is silent on multiple factors in the Schwab test, however, and Plaintiff further relies on the Contract itself to demonstrate that a question of material fact exists on several of the other factors. Upon review, the Court concludes that the record is not sufficiently crystallized with respect to the Schwab factors to warrant the legal conclusion that Defendant was not acting on behalf of the District to avoid being subject to the Public Records Act. The Court will thus assume arguendo that Defendant was subject to the '- The factors considered include, but are not limited to: 1) the level of public funding; 2) commingling of funds; 3) whether the activity was conducted on publicly owned property; 4) whether services contracted for are an integral part of the public agency's chosen decision- making process; 5) whether the private entity is performing a governmental function or a function which the public agency otherwise would perform; 6) the extent of the public agency's involvement with, regulation of, or control over the private entity; 7) whether the private entity was created by the public agency; 8) whether the public agency has a substantial financial interest in the private entity; and 9) for who's benefit the private entity is functioning. Schwab, 596 So. 2d at 1031. Act and turn to the second issue. Defendant also seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether there was an unlawful refusal pursuant to section 119.12, Florida Statutes. Where a civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the provisions of the Public Records Act, the court is required to assess and award the reasonable costs of enforcement, including attorney's fees, against the agency responsible if it determines that the agency unlawfully refused to permit a public record to be inspected or copied. § 119.12, Fla. Stat. (2014). Here, Defendant ultimately fulfilled the Request, but not until after suit was filed. "Delay cannot in itself create liability under section 119.12." Office of State Attorney for Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida v. Gonzalez, 953 So. 2d 759, 765 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). "Unlawful refusal under section 119.12 includes not only affirmative refusal to produce records, but also unjustified delay in producing them." Yasir v. Forman, 149 So. 3d 107, 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (quoting Lilker v. Suwannee Valley Transit Auth., 133 So.3d 654, 655-56 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)). "Where delay is at issue, as here, the court must determine whether the delay was justified under the facts of the particular case." Lilker, 74 So. 3d at 655 (citation omitted). The Fourth District Court of Appeal has explained the trial court's task under section 119.12 as follows. The trial court should determine "whether a party had to file a civil action against an agency to compel compliance." Althouse v. Pahn Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 92 So. 3d 899, 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Here, that is undisputedly the case, given Defendant's testimony that it did not believe the Request was legitimate until the lawsuit was filed. "[I]f so, if no reasonable or good faith belief existed to withhold such documents, then the court shall assess reasonable costs of enforcement." Id. (emphasis omitted). Whether a refusal to permit inspection was unreasonable and justified an award of attorney's fees is a question of fact that may be determined on summary judgment. Cape Coral Med. Ctr., Inc. v. News -Press Pub. Co., 390 So. 2d 1216, 1218 & n.5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Similarly, "[w]hether a governmental entity acted in `good faith' in the manner in which it responded to a request for disclosure of public records is necessarily a question for the court to decide based on the circumstances of a case." Consumer Rights, LLC v. Union Cnty., Fla., No. 1D14-2653, 2015 WL 798087, at *3 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 26, 2015). Here, Defendant contends that the delay in responding to the Request was justifiable and thus did not amount to an unlawful refusal. Defendant primarily relies on a closely analogous case, Consumer Rights. There, a public records request was sent from an email account bearing the address ask4records@gmail.com. Consumer Rights, 2015 WL 798087 at *1. The request was sent to an email address posted on Union County's website that was not associated with a particular employee, UCBOCC@windstream.net. Id. Moreover, the request was made on behalf of an unidentified "Florida company" and submitted by an unnamed agent of that company, and it did not contain any information about how to contact the agent or corporation. Id. The email provided that it was a "PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST" in capital letters. Id. Four months after the email request was sent, Consumer Rights, LLC filed a public records lawsuit against Union County. Id. at *2. After the lawsuit was filed, Union County provided the records at issue. Id. On the issue of attorney's fees, the trial court heard testimony from a county official, who explained that he did not respond to the request immediately because it appeared to constitute "phishing," "a term that refers to a scam to dupe an email recipient into revealing personal or confidential information that can later be used illicitly." Id. The trial court ultimately concluded that Consumer Rights, LLC was not entitled to attorney's fees because Union County's delay in providing the records was not tantamount to an unlawful refusal. Id. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. Id. at *1, 5. The court concluded that the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the county was justified in not immediately responding to the email request. Id. at *3. In reaching its conclusion, the court expressly acknowledged that "[t]he plaintiff was not required to identify himself in the request or to reveal his reason for requesting the records." Id. at *4. Nevertheless, because the request "was made by an unnamed agent for an undisclosed company" and "was sent to the county from an email address that did not appear to be the address of a person," it "would lead anyone familiar with the perils of email communication to exercise caution, if not to disregard the communication entirely." Id. The court added that "the delay in this case could have been avoided altogether if the plaintiff had just given the county a phone number or some other contact information that could be associated with a person" Id. We know of no law that requires a governmental entity to provide public records to a generic email address, at least not until such time as it is made clear that the address belongs to a person. If a generic email address were treated as the equivalent of a "person" within the meaning of the constitution and the statute, an unscrupulous computer hacker could bring the work of a government agency to a halt by randomly generating a multiplicity of requests, all of which would require a response, and in the process expose the agency to multiple attorney fee awards for no good reason. The county provided the records to the plaintiff soon after it learned that the request had been made by person on behalf of a Florida corporation that did, in fact, exist. We have no reason to believe that the county would not have provided the records much sooner had it been able to verify the authenticity of the plaintiffs email and thus we have no reason to question to trial court's conclusion that the county acted in good faith. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the delay in responding to the email was not tantamount to a refusal and that the trial court correctly denied the plaintiffs request for attorney fees. Id. at *4-5. Consumer Rights is analogous with the instant case in all material respects. With respect to the Request itself, the email was sent from an address that did not appear to belong to a person, vendor.contract.publishing@gmail.com. The name associated with the account was "An Onoma." While the email's subject line did state, "This is a public records request," there was no indication in the email that the request was being made on behalf of a person or company, nor did the email contain any information about how to contact the person or corporation making the request. Moreover, the email was sent to robin.petzold@wantmangroup.com.didtheyreadit.com. Neither the underlying contract nor Defendant's website identifies Robin Petzold (or anyone else) as a custodian of public records. Further, the "didtheyreadit.com" extension rendered the email address one not recognized by Defendant's computer network. For these reasons, the Request itself was one that "would lead anyone familiar with the perils of email communication to exercise caution, if not to disregard the communication entirely." Consumer Rights, 2015 WL 798087 at *4. The undisputed evidence in this case also confirms that Defendant acted in good faith and that its delay in responding was attributable to the suspicious nature of the email. Defendant has presented unrebutted affidavit testimony that it believed the Request to be illegitimate and spam and for that reason did not respond to it. It provided additional affidavit testimony that it voluntarily produced the requested document after the lawsuit was filed, when it realized that the email was not intended to be spam or junk mail. Plaintiff has presented no evidence which gives the Court "reason to believe that [Defendant] would not have provided the records much sooner had it been able to verify the authenticity of the plaintiffs email." Consumer Rights, 2015 WL 798087 at *5. Put another way, Plaintiff presented no contradictory evidence to demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact with respect to Defendant's good faith. Indeed, the Court gave Plaintiffs counsel the opportunity to point to record evidence that would demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact on Defendant's subjective good faith. Plaintiff's counsel conceded that there was no such evidence and instead maintained the position that Defendant's good faith was immaterial. As explained above, Defendant's good faith is not only material on the issue of whether it unlawfully refused to respond to Plaintiffs request, it is dispositive. For the foregoing reasons, there is no question of material fact with respect to whether Defendant's delay in responding to Plaintiffs public records request was justifiable. As the delay was justifiable, it did not amount to an unlawful refusal. Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to whether there was an unlawful refusal for purposes of section 119.12, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART with respect to whether Defendant unlawfully refused to provide public records, but DENIED IN PART with respect to whether Defendant is subject to the Public Records Act. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff takes nothing by this suit and Defendant shall go hence without day. The Court reserves jurisdiction to adjudicate Defendant's Motion for 57.105 Sanctions and to determine taxable costs. DONE AND ORDERED in West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, on this 4th day of May, 2015. p�+pi � arnira� •aoe, ereenee eenee or me corer MEENU SASSER, CIRCUIT JUDGE Copies furnished: Daniel DeSouza, Esq.; DeSouza Law, P.A.; 1515 N. University Drive, Suite 209, Coral Springs, FL 33071; ddesouza@desouzalaw.com; ddesouza@becker-poliakoff.com Nick Taylor, Esq.; The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C.; 1286 West Newport Center Drive, Deerfield Beach, FL 33442; ntaylor@oboylelaw£rm.com Gerald Richman, Esq.; Leora B. Freire, Esq.; Richman Greer, P.A.; 250 Australian Avenue South, Ste. 1504, West Palm Beach FL 33401; grichman@richmangreer.com; Ifreire@richmanereer.com; dcostonis@richmangreer.com; Renee Basel From: Bill Thrasher Sent: Monday, May 4, 2015 5:18 PM To: scottmorgan75@gmail.com Subject: RE: Decision- CAR v. Wantman Group Great news. Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE smartphone -------- Original message -------- From: scottmorgan75@gmail.com Date: 05/04/2015 4:24 PM (GMT -05:00) To: Bill Thrasher <bthrasher@gulf-stream.org>, Kelly Avery <kavery@gulf-stream.org> Subject: Decision- CAFI v. Wantman Group Another victory for the good guys! Note: Wantman Group is our co -plaintiff in the RICO case. Renee Basel From: scottmorgan75@gmail.com Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2015 11:59 AM To: Garrett Ward; Bill Thrasher; dmr@wakayaperfection.com Subject: Fw: 540 middle road Chief, See email below. Please have an officer look into this matter for Mr. Roth. Let's discuss how best to address this contractor's continuing violation of our construction rules. Scott W. Morgan 1315 Neptune Dr. Boynton Beach, FL 33426 (561) 752-1936 From: David Roth Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2015 10:32 AM To: scottmorgan75Calgmail.com Cc: gward()gulf-stream.org ; Anita Subject: Re: Fw: 540 middle road All - I am sitting on Middle Road unable to drive out to Polo due to the congestion of trucks. This is truly unacceptable ... I will call the contractor now but wanted to advise of the situation. Thank you: -David Roth On May 14, 2015 10:25 AM, <scottmorean75(a)email.com> wrote: Chief, Per our conversation this morning, I am forwarding David's email with attached photograph of trash and debris at 540 Middle Rd.—this was at about 5:30 pm last night. Would you please check the records of complaints and noticed violations on this project, and then give me a call to discuss how best to address the ongoing nature of these problems? Thank you. Scott W. Morgan 1315 Neptune Dr. Boynton Beach, FL 33426 (561) 752-1936 cell: 573-6006 From: David Roth Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2015 9:00 AM To: scottmorgan75(dgmail.com Cc: Anita Subject. As discussed/540 middle road Good morning Scott - thanks for taking my call. I sent you the attached photo via text as well - it was just a quick photo I took last night before heading to the Town Meeting - but the situation is consistently thus and often much worse with garbage, insulation etc. routinely blowing into our and the neighbors' yards. The construction has been going on almost two years at 540 Middle Road, and has been nothing but a nightmare for us all (Mrs. Hanson across the street was so grateful to me for being willing to contact you today since she is also so upset but does not know what to do.) The problems have been numerous and we have called the police at least twice when clouds of cement dust blew into our house twice in one week because they did not rent a concrete sander with a vacuum bag (by the own admission of the contractor.) Bottom line, you and I both know construction, and the project at 540 Middle Road has crossed so many lines so many times that it calls our own enforcement procedures into question. Thanks for your assistance, Scott - please advise what else you need (we have many photos!) The General Contractor on the project is Counihan Construction at 561 722 6266. Best, -David Roth 539 Middle Road David M. Roth CEO The Wakaya Group - Wellness Perfected! www.wakayaperfection.com www.wakava.com +1310 384 2994 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Roth <dmr@wakayaperfection.com> Date: Wed, May 13, 2015 at 7:15 PM Subject: 540 middle road To: David Roth <dmr@wakayaperfection.com> Renee Basel From: scottmorgan75@gmail.com Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 11:27 AM To: Robert Sweetapple; Joanne O'Connor; Bill Thrasher Subject: Fw: O'Boyle Affidavit Attachments: O'Boyle Affidavit.pdf Attached please find the affidavit in resolution of the UPL complaints against JO. The UPL committee discussions, negotiations and minutes are confidential so we will not have access to them. The UPS committee made its decision in mid-May and so did not have an opportunity to review the recent packet of documents that I submitted last week. I spoke with attorney Vazquez, who said she would read those materials, although I suspect that is for personal edification, only. She emphasized that the matter is now closed based upon JO's agreements as described in the affidavit. Scott W. Morgan 1315 Neptune Dr. Boynton Beach, FL 33426 (561) 752-1936 From: Algeisa M Vazauez-Pagano Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 11:09 AM To: scottmoraan750)gmail.com Cc: Diane Kinishi Subject: O'Boyle Affidavit Algeisa "Ali" Vazquez Branch UPL Counsel The Florida Bar 1300 Concord Terrace, Suite 130 Sunrise, Florida 33323 Tel. (954) 835-0233 ext. 4148 AVazquez@flabar.org www.floridabar.org Please note: Florida has very broad public records laws. Many written communications to or from The Florida Bar regarding Bar business may be considered public records, which must be made available to anyone upon request. Your e-mail communications may therefore be subject to public disclosure. Please note: Florida has very broad public records laws. Many written communications to or from The Florida Bar regarding Bar business may be considered public records, which must be made available to anyone upon request. Your e-mail communications may therefore be subject to public disclosure. AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHAN R. O'BOYLE STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF BROWARD File No. 20151027(17C) BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, duly authorized to administer oaths, personally appeared JONATHAN R. O'BOYLE, who after first being duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 1. I am not a member of The Florida Bar and am not licensed to practice law in the State of Florida. I am licensed to practice law in the States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 2. I permanently reside in the State of New Jersey. 3. I certify that 1 have read and will abide by the following decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida: The Florida Bar v. Rapoport, 845 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2003); Chandris v. I'anakakis, 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995); The Florida Bar v. Tate, 552 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 1989); The Florida Bar v. Kaiser, 397 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1981); The Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1978); State of Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962); judgment vacated on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); and Rule 2.510, Florida Rules of Judicial Administration; and Rule 4-5.5 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 4. 1 understand that it constitutes a contempt of the Supreme Court of Florida as well as a third degree felony under the Florida Statutes for an unlicensed individual and/or business entity to engage in the practice of law and/or hold himself/itself out as authorized to so practice in the State of Florida. 5. 1 understand that it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for persons not licensed to practice in Florida but licensed in other jurisdictions to either expressly or impliedly, personally or by use of advertisement, hold themselves out as members of The Florida Bar and generally authorized to practice law in Florida or able to render assistance with legal matters. 6. 1 understand that persons not licensed to practice in Florida but licensed in other jurisdictions may not perform legal services or give legal advice to or for Florida residents on matters of Florida substantive law unless otherwise authorized by court rule, case law, administrative rule, or Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. 7. 1 understand that persons not licensed to practice in Florida but licensed in other jurisdictions may not advertise to the public either through the media, by telephone, by facsimile or other direct solicitation that they are qualified and able to provide legal services in Florida or relating to Florida law. 8. I understand that an attorney licensed in a state other than Florida may not appear in any Florida state court as a representative of a party or otherwise participate in any Florida litigation pending in State Court on behalf of any party unless admitted pro hoc vice pursuant to the dictates of Rule 2.510 of the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration. I understand that as an attorney licensed in a state other than Florida and being a resident of Florida, I am only eligible to be admitted to practice before the state court pro hac vice in Florida if I have an application pending for admission to The Florida Bar and have not previously been denied admission to The Florida Bar. 9. I understand that once an interstate law firm has been established under the dictates of Savitt, an out-of-state attorney's name may only appear on the letterhead and business cards of the law firm if his jurisdictional limitations are clearly noted on the letterhead or business cards indicating that the attorney is not authorized to practice in Florida. 10. I understand that it constitutes the unlicensed practice of law for a Florida office of an interstate law firm to operate without a partner admitted to practice law in Florida. 11. 1 understand that an out-of-state member of an interstate law firm may give advice on the laws of jurisdictions other than Florida to non -Florida clients in transactions with persons residing in Florida or with business enterprises having their principal place of business in Florida provided that the nonmember of The Florida Bar giving the advice is in Florida on a transitory basis and provided that a member of The Florida Bar handles matters involving Florida law. I also understand that I may only engage in transitory professional activities that are incidental to essentially out-of-state transactions and that I may only coordinate supervisory activities in essentially multi -state transactions in which matters of Florida law are handled by members of The Florida Bar. The Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1978) citing Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 313, 205 A.2d 146 (1964) and In re the Estate of Waring, 47 N.J. 367, 221 A.2d 193 (1966). 12. 1 understand that an out-of-state member of an interstate law firm may give legal advice concerning a right or obligation governed by federal law only if the lawyer is in Florida on a transitory basis and it must initially be made clear to the client and immediately confirmed in writing that the lawyer is not a member of The Florida Bar. The Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1978). 13. 1 understand that where there is a federal law or statute that specifically allows practice before a federal office or agency, Florida continues to maintain control over the practice of law within its borders except to the limited extent necessary for the accomplishment of the federal objectives. 14. I, therefore, understand that as an attorney licensed in a state other than Florida, I may not operate or maintain a law office in Florida, including but not limited to (a) maintaining a law office in Florida as my primary physical business location; (b) performing legal services or giving legal advice to or for Florida residents on matters of Florida substantive law; (c) acting as a managing partner of a Florida law firm; and (d) exercising supervisory control over any associate of the law firm who is a member of The Florida Bar with respect to matters involving Florida law. 15. 1 further understand that as I am not a member of The Florida Bar, I may not identify myself as the managing partner of The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C. with a Florida address. I agree to discontinue use of any business cards, firm letterhead, advertisements, business cards, retainer agreements, or any other forms or correspondences when using a Florida address and the title attorney or attorney at law or any other similar title. I will include distinguishing limitations indicating either that I am not a member of The Florida Bar or that I am only licensed to practice law in the States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 16. I understand a Florida lawyer may be a member of an interstate law firm if the relationship is a bona fide partnership in which the profits and losses of the several offices are governed by a partnership agreement. As indicated in the shareholder agreement forming The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C., the parties intend to operate the interstate law firm in accordance with all regulations in Florida and each requirement of Savitt. Accordingly, the profits and losses of all offices of The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C. will be included in determining allocations, which will not be based exclusively on the business generated or handled by the Florida office. Specifically, The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.0 shareholder agreement will clearly delineate the name of the member of The Florida Bar that serves as the Florida Managing Partner in Florida and how the Florida Managing Partner shares in the firm's total profits and losses. I hereby acknowledge that the current partnership agreement requires amendments in order to comply with Savitt and therefore an Amended Partnership Agreement will be completed and provided to The Florida Bar on or before by May 19, 2015. 17. I further understand that as an applicant for admission to The Florida Bar I may not operate in the Florida office of an interstate law firm on a permanent basis in any manner other than as a traditional law clerk under the direct supervision and control of a member of The Florida Bar. I further understand that should my name appear on the letterhead of the Florida office, the title law clerk or other similar nonlawyer title must appear after my name. As I may only work as a law clerk if in the Florida office on a permanent basis, my name may not appear in the name of the firm or be listed as an attorney for the Florida office of the law firm. 18. Until such time as I am admitted to practice law in Florida, I hereby agree to provide a complete and signed copy of this Affidavit to any and all current and future Florida Managing Partner(s) of The O'Boyle Law Firm, P.C., as well as to current and future associate attorneys and employees. 19. I understand that I am not admitting any wrongdoing and I agree that I will not engage in any activity that constitutes the unlicensed practice of law in Florida unless and until I am admitted to practice in this state by the Supreme Court of Florida. O'BOYLE The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me on this, the 1 q-fdt day of May, 2015 by JONATHAN R O'BOYLE, who is personally known to me or who has produced N,T 7b L- as identification and who did take an oath. 1�7V"' " Notary Public State of Florida at Large (Signature) -Diane. Kinis'bti (Printed or Typed Name) DWE " icor commmm r l; ' ocwaes: uy so, sols Nwrvwr unaenum„