HomeMy Public PortalAboutMtn for Partial Judgment/Def's Mtn to Exclude Witness/ Mtn for Judgment (O'Boyle)Case: 15-13433 Date Filed: 10/08/2015 Page: 1 of 12
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE; E:LE:VENhH CIRCUIT
Appeal No: 15 -13433 -DD
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
The Honorable Kenneth A. Marra, No. 9:15-ev-80182-KAM
TOWN OF GULF STREAM, a municipality organized
and existing under the Laws of Florida on its own CLASS ACTION
behalf and on behalf of those municipalities similarly
situated, and WANTMAN GROUP, INC., a domestic
company on its own behalf and on behalf of those
companies similarly situated,
Plaintiffs -Appellants,.
vs.
MARTIN E, O'BOYLE, an individual, CHRISTOPHER
O'HARF,, an individual, WILLIAM RING, an
individual, JONATHAN R. O'BOYLE, an individual, DFINISI?
DEMARTINI, an individual, GIOVANI MESA, an individual,
NICKLAUS TAYLOR, an individual, RYAN WITMER, an
individual, AIRLINE HIGHWAY, LLC, COMMERCE GP, INC.,
CG ACQUISITION CO., INC., CRO AVIA'T'ION, INC., ASSET
F,NHANCEMI.NT, INC., COMMERCE REALTY GROUP, INC.,
PUBLIC AWARENESS INSTIT'UTET , INC., CITIZENS
AWARENESS FOUNDATION, INC., OUR PUBLIC RECORDS,
LLC, STOPDIRTYGOVERNMENT, I,LC, COMMERCE
GROUP, INC., and'I'IIF, O'BOYL1- LAW FIRM, P.C., INC.,
Defendants -Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT WANTMAN GROUPINC.
Gerald F. Richman
RICHMAN GREER, P.A.
250 Australian Ave. South, Ste. 1504
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
Telephone: (561) 803-3500
Facsimile: (561) 820-1608
Counsel for Plaintiff=Appellant
6I untman Group, Inc.
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Appeal No; 15 -13433 -AD
Page 3 of 12
GLASS, Esq., ROBERT C. (Counsel for Defendants)
GMM MADISON, P,A,
HANNA, Esq., MARK (Counsel for Defendant)
JONES, FOSTER, JOHNSTON & STUBBS, P.A.
LAW OFFICES OF STUART MICHELSON
MARK, Esq., ETAN (Counsel for Defendants)
MARRA, JUDGE KENNETH A. (Presiding District Court Judge)
MCCABE RABIN, P.A. (Counsel for Defendants)
MESA, GIOVANI (Counsel for Defendants)
MICHELSON, Esq., STUART R. (Counsel for Defendants)
O'BOYLE, JONATHAN R.
O'BOYLE, MARTIN E.
O'CONNOR, Esq., JOANNE M. (Counsel for Appellant Town of
Gulfstream)
O'HARE, CHRISTOPHER
OUR PUBLIC RECORDS, LLC
PUBLIC AWARENESS INSTITUTE, INC,
RABIN, Esq., ADAM T. (Counsel for Defendants)
RICHMAN GREER, P.A.
RICHMAN, Esq., GERALD F. (Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants)
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Case: 15-13433 Date FiletbW0a/PWM sTlEtagW41 (FUN E. o'BOYLE et al.
Appeal No: 1513433-A)
Page 5 of 12
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(i) and Eleventh Circuit Rule 28-I(f),
Wantman hereby joins in and adopts, in its entirety, the Statement Regarding Oral
Argument contained in the brief filed by co -appellant, TOWN OF GULF
STREAM, in this case.
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Case: 15-13433 Date FiledoW@6 BM sTffh—Q s:VMl1QN E, o'aoY1.13 et al.
Appeal No: 15 -13433 -DD
Page 7 of 12
STATEMENT REGARDING ADOPTION
OF BRIEF OF OTHER PARTY
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(i) and Eleventh Circuit Rule 28,10,
Wantman hereby joins, adopts and incorporates herein by reference the Appellant's
Brief filed in this case by co -appellant, TOWN OF GULF STREAM.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(i) and Eleventh Circuit Rule 28-1(f),
Wantman hereby joins in and adopts, in its entirety, the Preliminary Statement
contained in the Appellant's Brief filed by co -appellant, TOWN OF GULF
STREAM,
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(i) and Eleventh Circuit Rule 28-1(f),
Wantman hereby joins in and adopts, in its entirety, the Statement of Jurisdiction
contained in the Appellant's Brief filed by co -appellant, TOWN OF GULF
STREAM.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(i) and Eleventh Circuit Rule 28-1(f),
Wantman hereby joins in and adopts, in its entirety, the Statement of the Issues
contained in Appellant's Brief filed by co -appellant, TOWN OF GULF STREAM.
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Case: 15-13433 Date R1etiJtiWW/ZQ15 STOWL.WFMN F.. o'AOYLF et at.
Appeal Not 15 -13433 -DD
Page 9 of 12
Dated: 10/8/15 Respectfully submitted,
By/s/:,Gerald F. Richman
GERALD F. RICHMAN
Florida Bar No.: 066457
grichman@richmangreer.com
deostonis@richmanp,reer.com
ERIC M. SODHI
Florida Bar No.: 0583871
esodhi(@richt-nanp,reer.com
mramirez@richmangreer.com
kkadl ac@ri chmanereer.conl
LEORA B. FREIRE
Florida Bar No.: 0013488
1 freireRrichmangreer.com
deostonis(24richmangreer.eoln
RIGH MAN GREER, P.A.
250 Australian Ave. South, Ste. 1504
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
Telephone: (561) $03-3500
Facsimile: (561) 820-1608
Counsel for Plaintis/Appellants
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Case: 15-13433 Date Flledol MU/2Aha' s-1-POW:vlft.mkitatl F. O•BOYLF et al.
Appeal No: 15 -13433 -DD
Page 11 of 12
SERVICE LIST
Steven D. Weber
swe ber(a7,bergers imerm an. com
drtRbergersinaennan.com
ltorres ,bergersingerman.com
Etan Mark
emark@bergersingerman.com
drti bergersingerman.com
ltorres a,ber eg rsingerman.com
Mitchell W. Berger
mberger@ber eg rsingennan.com
BERGER SINGERMAN
Las Olas Centre II
350 E. Las Olas Blvd. Suite
1000
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
Tel: 954.525.9900
Attorneys for Martin E. O'Boyle, Airline
Highway LLC,
Commerce Gp Inc., GC Acquisition Co. Inc.,
CROAviation Inc., Asset Enhancement Inc.,
Commerce Realty Group Inc., and Commerce
Group Inc.
Stuart R. Michelson
smichelson a,smichelsonlaw.com
LAW OFFICES OF STUART MICHELSON
800 SE 3d Avenue, 4th Floor
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316
Tel: 954.463.6100
Attorneys far Giovanni Mesa, Nicklaus
Taylor and Ryan Witmer
Daniel DeSouza
ddesouza@desouzalaw.com
desouzalaw.com
DESOUZA LAW, P.A.
101 N. Third Avenue
Suite 1500
Ft. Lauderdale, FL
33301
Tel: 954.551.5320
Attorneys for Denise DeMartini,
Citizens Awareness Foundation Inc.,
Our Public Records LLC, Stop Dirty
Government LLC, and Public
Awareness Institute, Inc.
Adam T. Rabin
arabin cilmccaberabin.com
Robert C. Glass
rglass(c4mccaberabin.com
MCCABE RABIN, P.A.
1600 Forum Place, Suite 505
Palm Beach, FL 33401
Tel: 561.659.7878
Attorneys for William Ring, Jonathan
O'Boyle
And The O'Boyle Law Firm, P. C., Inc.
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LAW OFFICES
JOHNSON, ANSELMO, MURDOCH, BURKE, PIPER & HOCHMAN, P.A.
A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
DAMIAN H. ALBERT, PA.
W. HAMPTON JOHNSON, IV
SCOTT D. ALEXANDER. PA
B
2455 EAST SUNRISE BOULEVARD
J. MARCOS MARTINEZ
MICHAEL T. BURKE•
SUITE SE
ROBERT E. MURDOCH
MELISSA BUTTON
FORT LAUDERDALEFL 33704
.
MICHAEL R. PIPER'
HUDSON C. GILL. PA
DAVID M. SCHWEIGER, PA.
JEFFREY L HOCHMAN, PA.
CHRISTOPHER L. SMITH
E. BRUCE JOHNSON'
(964) 463-0,OD BMN"
CHRISTOPHER J. STEARNS, PA
(705) 045-2000 Dade
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RONALD P. ANSELMO
•MORD lTA:4rFUrnTL:At ituxleAs
BURL F. GEORGE
February 13, 2015
Irma Cohen VIA EMAIL
Florida League of Cities
PO Box 538135
Orlando, FL 32853-8135
Re: Martin O'Boyle v. Town of Gulf Stream
Claim No.: GC2014077401
Our File No.: 00640/34107
Case No.: 13-ev-80317-DMM
Dear Ms. Cohen:
Enclosed please find a copy of the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in
the above -referenced matter.
The enclosure argues (1) that the Town's prior sign ordinance (the ordinance has since been
amended) violated the First Amendment by creating content -based classifications for various signs,
and (2) that the Town's application of the prior sign ordinance to the Plaintiff during his election
campaign in March 2014 violated his rights under the First Amendment.
Our research indicates that similar ordinances which categorize signs by their content (i.e.,
real estate signs as opposed to political signs, etc.) have been subjected to strict scrutiny. In such
cases, courts regularly invalidate the content -based ordinances and find that the classifications are
not substantially related to the achievement of a compelling governmental interest nor are the
classifications the least restrictive means of addressing the governmental interest. If the court applies
the typical analysis here, the Plaintiff is likely to prevail on his claims against the Town under the
First Amendment.
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 1 of 12
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 14-80317-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKSBRANNON
MARTIN E. O'BOYLE,
Plaintiff,
VS.
THE TOWN OF GULF STREAM,
Defendant.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW)
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff MARTIN E.
OBOYLE ("O'BOYLE") respectfully moves the Court for entry of partial summary judgment in
his favor. O'BOYLE shows through his Statement of Facts, Memorandum of Law, and other
supporting documentation that summaryjudgment is appropriate at this time on all issues except
the appropriate amount of damages and attorneys' fees to be awarded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1988.
WHEREFORE, O'BOYLE respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter
summary judgment on all issues in this action except for determining the proper measure of
damages and fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988.
FURTHER, and in support of this Motion, the O'Boyle would refer this Honorable Court
to the Memorandum of Law attached hereto and by reference made a part hereof.
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 3 of 12
7. On February 21, 2014, Town Manager Thrasher ("Thrasher") issued Plaintiff a
charging document from the Town, stating that Plaintiff was in violation of Town Code §
66-446(a)(5)(d), which prohibits placing political signs anywhere on public property or
right-of-ways. See Charging Document (Pt.'s Exh. Q.
8. Thrasher gave Plaintiff twelve (12) hours to remove the signs on public property
or right-of-ways and informed him that is he did not, the Town would do so for him. Id.
9. On February 24, 2014, Plaintiff received a second charging document stating
that his banner -clad truck was in violation of the Town Code § 66-446(a)(5)(d) because it
carried signs on public property and right-of-way. See Charging Document (Pl.'s Exh. D).
10. On March 1 and March 2, 2014, Plaintiff campaigned door-to-door in the Place
An Soleil district of the Town and earned the consent of numerous residents to place his
political signs on their lawns. See Affidavit of O'Boyle, 110 (Pl.'s Exh. B).
11. On March 3, 2014, Thrasher directed Town police to remove all of Plaintiff's
political signs in right-of-way in the Place An Soleil district. See Sgt. John Haseley
Incident Report (Pl.'s Exh. E).
12. On March 3, 2014, Town police and public works employees removed
Plaintiffs signs that were placed throughout the Town including private property. See
Affidavit of Dr. Brody, 116-12 (Pl.'s Exh. F); also Affidavit of O'Boyle, $ 3 (Pl.'s Exh.
a]
13. While removing Plaintiff's signs, Town police and public works employees did
not remove real estate signs. See Sgt. John Haseley Incident Report (Pl.'s Exh. E).
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 5 of 12
ARGUMENT
I. This Case is Not Moot.
The Town's subsequent adoption of a New Sign Ordinance does not render this case
moot] as Plaintiff's Amended Complaint included multiple pleas for equitable relief, damages,
and attorneys' fees. See [Amend. Compl., DE 28]. The Supreme Court has consistently held that
a claim for damages saves a case from the bar of mootness. E.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. West Virginia Dep'! of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2001) ("for so
long as the plaintiff has a cause of action for damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not
moot the case"); Fulton Corp. Y. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 328 (1996) (holding that repeal of a
regulation does not effect a claim for damages); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436
U.S. 1, 8 (1978) ("[r]espondents' claim for actual and punitive damages arising from
[defendant's] termination of service saves this cause from the bar of mootness"). The Eleventh
Circuit has agreed. Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112,
1119 (11th Cir. 2003); Crown Media, LLC v. Gwinnetl County, 380 F.3d 1317, 1325 (1 lth Cir.
2004); Naturisl Society, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1992). Thus, this action
is not moot.
II. Town Sign Code Regulated Signs Based On Content Displayed and Identity
of the Speaker
The Town Code is chock full of content -based restrictions on speech. Eg., Gulf Stream,
Fla. Code §§ 66-1; 66-446; 66-448. The regulations broadly define "Sign" as [a]ny
advertisement, announcement, direction, or communication produced on whole or in part by the
construction, erection, or affixing or placing of any structure land or water or on any other
1 On January 26, 2015, the Town adopted Ordinance 15/1 repealing and replacing the challenged
provisions §§ 66-446, 66-447, 66448. See Ordinance 15/1 (Pl.'s Exh. G).
5
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puu outeu Sw,fjtluopt suits Sutldwaxa) (b)(u)9bb-99 '•(shm-jo-jgSu ut pue Apadatd otlgnd uo
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so paaeld „sults suotletoosse otnto lgoid-uou ao satoua& jeluawwanoS„(j) Sutldwaxa) (l)(e)9bb
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sauoSa)eo uteliao sldwaxo 6ljogm .taglmj umoy aqy pl •)saaalut atlgnd oql ut suot)etoosse atnta
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 7 of 12
Dimmit! v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1993), and Solantic, LLC v. City of
Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250 (1 Ith Cir. 2005)." Beaulieu, 454 F.3d 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2006).
In Dimmitt, the Eleventh Circuit invalidated an ordinance that required property owners to obtain
permits before erecting or altering most signs but exempted certain types of signs, including
flags representing a governmental body. Dimmitt, 985 F.2d at 1568. The court found that the
ordinance was a content -based restriction because the flag exemption applied only to
governmental bodies. Id. at 1569. Furthermore, in Solantic, the Eleventh Circuit once again
struck down an ordinance that exempted signs bearing certain content from the general
permitting requirement, holding "because some types of signs are extensively regulated while
others are exempt from regulation based on the nature of the messages they seek to convey ....
the ordinance [is) content -based." Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1266; also Cafe Erotica of Fla., Inc. V.
St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting county's assertion of content -
neutrality recognizing that "the County needs information regarding, at a minimum, the type of
proposed message in order to determine the appropriate sign category, which in tum determines
the sign's allowable size and location").
The same conclusions in Dimmitt and Solantic, must be reached in regard to the Town's
Sign Code. Indeed, the Town's sign code (i) contains a content -based exemption for
governmental signs similar to the one invalidated in Dimmitt, (ii) exempts signs containing
certain favored messages as in Solantic, and (iii) requires that all signs except for real estate
signs, "be reviewed and approved by the architectural review and planning board prior to the
placement of such signs" similar to Cafe Erotica. In light of these numerous content -based
exemptions and restrictions, the Town Code cannot be characterized as content neutral.
7
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 9 of 12
promote that interest. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813; also, Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass 'n, 131 S.
Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (holding that an ordinance is invalid unless the government can
demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny — that is, unless it is justified by a compelling
government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.) If a regulation that abridges
speech because of the content of the speech is subject to the strict scrutiny standard of judicial
review. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 944 So.2d 317, 323 (F1a.2006). Strict scrutiny is "the most
demanding test known to constitutional law." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997),
and Town's Code cannot withstand it.
The Town justifies its sign ordinance on the basis of traffic safety, aesthetics, and other
Town interest. The Town Code provides in relevant part:
The purpose of [the sign ordinance] is to implement the town comprehensive
development plan adopted in 1990 in conformance with Local Government
Comprehensive Plan Act 1985; to specifically divide the town into districts in
accordance with comprehensive plan; to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure
safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to provide adequate light and air; to
prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to
facilitate the adequate provision of transpiration, water sewerage, schools, parks
and other public requirements; and to generally promote the health, safety and
welfare of present and future residents.
Gulf Stream, Fla. Code § 66.3(a). Despite the Town's stated reasoning, the courts have rejected
these oft -asserted interests as compelling in nature and thus insufficient to justify content -based
discrimination among signs. Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir.
1988) (interests in "traffic safety and aesthetics" are "substantial" but not "compelling");
Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1408 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[A] municipality's asserted
interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, while significant, have never been held to be
compelling"); Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1267 ("aesthetics and traffic safety" are not compelling
interests).
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 62 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 11 of 12
plaintiff may recover compensatory damages pursuant to Section 1983 if he establishes that a
violation of his constitutional rights has caused him injury); Lockridge v. Village of Alsip, 2005
WL 946880 (N.D. III. Apr. 18, 2005) (holding that claims for damages and attorneys' fees are
appropriate because the proposed signs would not be allowed); Trinity Outdoor, L.L.C. Y.
Oconee County, 2004 WL 5026733, (M.D. Ga. May 20, 2004).
Even if somehow the fact -finder is not convinced that Plaintiff has suffered economic
injury, nominal damages are due as a matter of law. Eg., Edwards v. Balisok 520 U.S. 641, 645
(1997); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992) (holding that where deprivation has occurred,
at a minimum, nominal damages must be awarded); Carey v. piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67
(1978) (nominal damages should be awarded even without any proof of injury); KH Outdoor,
LLC v. City of Trussville, 465 F.3d 1256, 1261 (1 ith Cir. 2006) (upholding $100 award of
nominal damages based on finding that portion of the challenged ordinance cited within the
application denials was constitutionally deficient); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 71 F.3d 837, 841-42
(11th Cir. 1996). Because the Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the enforcement of the
unconstitutional Town Sign Code, however, he should be given the opportunity to establish
damages before a fact -finder.
CONCLUSION
For any of several mutually exclusive reasons, the Town's Code is an unconstitutional
speech regulation. It is appropriate for this Court to hold the Town accountable by granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and affording the following relief: (i) declare
the Gulf Stream, Fla. Code §§66-1; 66-446(a)(1); 66A46(a)(2) and 66-448unconstitutional and
enjoin the Town's enforcement of same (ii) declare Plaintiff's entitlement to nominal damages
for proving the foregoing a violation of his constitutional rights; and (iii) provide Plaintiff with
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LAW OFFICES
JOHNSON, ANSELMO, MURDOCH, BURKE, PIPER & HOCHMAN, P.A.
A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
DAMIAN H. ALBERT, PA
W,HAMPTON JOHNSON, IV
SCOTT D. ALEXANDER, P.A.
2459 EAST SUNRISE BOULEVARD
J. MARCOS MARTINEZ
MICHAEL T. BURKE'
SUITE 1000
ROBERT E. MUROGCH
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 37304
MELISSABVPTON
MICHAEL R. PIPER'
HUDSON C. GILL, PA
DAVID M. SCHWEIGER, PA.
JEFFREY L. HOCHMAN, PA
CHRISTOPHER L. SMHH
E. BRUCE JOHNSON
(954)453.OIO0 Bmwazd
CHRISTOPHER J. STEARNS. PA
(305) 945-2000 Dade
(551)540-7448 WPB
RArmen
TELECOPIER (954) 483-2444
RONALD P. ANSELMO
-q DGa"r Mn MAMarr=
BURL F. GEORGE
February 16, 2015
Irma Cohen VIA EMAIL
Florida League of Cities
PO Box 538135
Orlando, FL 32853-8135
Re: Martin O'Boyle v. Town of Gulf Stream
Claim No.: GC2014077401
Our File No.: 00640/34107
Case No.: 13-cv-80317-DMM
Dear Ms. Cohen:
Enclosed please find a copy ofthe Motion we filed seeking to exclude the Plaintiff's damages
witness, Michael Ahearn.
The enclosure argues that Mr. Abeam relied upon no objective data and applied no standard
methodology to support his conclusionthatthe Plaintiffsuffered damages inthe approximate amount
of $50,000. As a result, we have asked the Court to exclude Mr. Ahearn so that the jury will not be
required to hear testimony which is based largely on speculation.
We will continue to keep you advised regarding developments of this case.
Very truly yours,
Ji>l a ochman
For the Finn
JLH/kme
Enclosure
cc: William Thrasher, Town Manager (w/encl.) Via Email
Joanne M. O'Connor, Esq. (w/encl.) Via Email
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 63 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 2 of 11
located, and (3) when any signs were allegedly removed, the Plaintiff intends to rely upon Ahearn
to establish damages of approximately $50,000.
3. Ahearn should not be allowed to provide expert testimony in this case because (a)
Ahearn is not qualified to serve as an expert witness and has never done so in the past; (b) assuming
arguendo that Ahearn were qualified (he is not), his opinions remain inadmissible because they are
unreliable, untestable, and cannot be duplicated — even by Ahearn; (c) Ahearn's opinions will not
assist the jury, and (d) Ahearn's opinions pose a substantial risk of confusing the jury and causing
prejudice.
WIIEREFORE, Defendant, TOWN OF GULF STREAM, respectfully requests the entry
of an Order excluding the opinions advanced by Michael G. Ahearn, together with such other and
further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
II. MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Ahearn's opinions fail under Rule 702's three-part rigorous analysis, which provides as
follows:
Expert testimony maybe admitted into evidence if: (1) the expert is
qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to
address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his
conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of
inquiry mandated in Daubert fv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993)]; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact,
through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized
expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
City of Tuscaloosa v. Hareros Chems. Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added);
United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en bane) (same).
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 63 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 4 of 11
Ahearn lacks any experience working on small, municipal election campaigns such as the
Plaintiffs campaign for the Town's March 11, 2014, election. Instead, Abeam's "experience" only
involves elections in well -populated, metropolitan areas which are significantly larger than the
Town. See Exhibit "A" (Aheam's Curriculum Vitae). As Ahearn conceded, his experience was
limited to Broward County. He had no personal knowledge of any campaign in Palm Beach County,
and he had no involvement in any Town election. See Exhibit "B"(Aheam'sdeposition testimony)
at p. 17; id. at p. 56 (at p. 56 (Q. Is all your campaign experience in Broward County? A. Yes. Q.
Do you have any campaigning experience in Palm Beach County? A. No, I do not. Q. Do you
know what the population of Gulf Stream is? A. No, I do not. Q. Do you know what the
demographic breakdown of Gulf Stream is? A. No, I do not. Q. Do you know how many contested
elections, municipal elections, there have been in Gulf Stream in the last 20 years? A. No, I do not.
(Emphasis added).
Aheam's limited experience in Broward County— involving countywide elections for circuit
court judges and the election of the Mayor of Fort Lauderdale -- does not qualify him to testify as
an expert about elections in a small, isolated area in Palm Beach County like the Town. There is
simply nothing in Aheam's experience that provides a foundation from which to testify about the
likely impact caused by the removal of the unknown number signs on an election population of less
than a 1000 persons. See Desai v. Falmer, No. 12-cv495, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152705, 11 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 28, 2014) ("[The proffered expert's] practical experience, while involving police
departments, is based on his long ago law enforcement training and experience in California. Such
experience is of little, if any, usefulness for offering opinions about the practices of a police
department in Florida."), citing, United States v. Hirschberg, 988 F.2d 1509,1513-14 (7th Cir. 1993)
4
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 63 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 6 of 11
analysis unreliable renders the expert's testimony inadmissible; this is true whether the step
completely changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies that methodology. In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litie., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994).
Nothing in Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence which is connected to existing data only by the words of the expert. To the contrary, a
court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1977). An expert's opinion should be
based on sound scientific principles; the Court is not required to admit opinion evidence "that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert." Joiner. 522 U.S. at 146. The
courtroom is not the place for guesswork. Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp.. 295 F. 3d 1194, 1202 (I I th
Cir. 2002). Here, Aheam's opinions should be excluded because they (1) lack a proper foundation
in fact, and (2) cannot be duplicated or tested.
The opinions set forth in Aheam's January 9, 2015, "report" are not reliable because they are
not based upon any objective data. See Exhibit "C" (Plaintiff's Answers to Expert Interrogatories
attaching and deferring to Aheam's report). During his deposition, Abeam conceded that he did not
make any effort to collect data, gather facts, or identify any objective information to support his
opinions. Exhibit `B" at pp. 24-25 ( Q. Do you know how many total signs Mr. O'Boyle put out
in his campaign to be Town Commissioner? A. I don't recall. I may have. I don't recall if I ever
knew a hard number. Q. Do you know if Mr. O'Boyle used any other forts of advertising in his
campaign? A. No. Q. Do you know what the final results were in terms of voles in the March I l th,
2014 Commission election? A. No. Q. Have you ever spoken to Mr. O'Boyle? A. No. Q. And
you've never met him? A. No.).
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and [they] failed to demonstrate the "same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice
of an expert in the relevant field"), citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Ahearn's reliance upon unsupported and unverified assumptions about advertising costs,
replacement values, and voter -behavior confirm the absence of a reliable methodology. An' `opinion
has a significance proportioned to the sources that sustain it." Martinez v. Rabbit Tanaka Corp., 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97084,40-41 (S.D. Fla.2006). When opinions are the product of an unreliable and
inadmissible methodology, they are not admissible. See Kunhho Tire 526 U.S. at 157 (quoting
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal
Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."). Here, Ahearn's speculative estimates should be
excluded.
C. Ahearn's Opinions Will Not Assist the Jury
To be admissible, expert testimony must assist the jury in understanding the evidence or
determining an issue through the application of his specialized expertise. Frazier. 387 F.3d at 1262
("[E]xpert testimony is admissible if it concerns matters that are beyond the understanding of the
average lay person."); United States v. Smith. 122 F.3d 1355, 1358 (l Ith Cir. 1997) ("Expert
testimony that does not assist the trier of fact can be excluded ...."); United States v. Rouco, 765
F,2d 983, 995 (11 th Cir. 1985) (same).
Ahearn's opinions should be excluded because they are "not needed to clarify facts and
issues of common understanding which [the trier of fact is] able to comprehend." Hibiscus
Associates Ltd. v. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen and Firemen Retirement Sys of City of Detroit, 50
F.3d 908, 917 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that expert testimony "is properly excluded when it is not
91
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Case 9:14-ev-80317-DMM Document 63 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 10 of 11
III. CONCLUSION
The City submits that Ahearn should not permitted to testify as expert. His past experience
in large elections in Broward County provides him with no qualifications to provide opinion
testimony regarding a small, municipal election in Palm Beach County. In addition, Aheam's
testimony is inadmissible because he has not relied on any data or objective information to formulate
his opinions and because he is unable explain the methodology used in formulating his opinion.
Nothing about Ahearn's speculative testimony will assist the jury.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of February, 2015, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing
document is being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the attached Service List in
the manner specified via transmission of Notice of Electronic Filing generated by CMIECF.
JOHNSON, ANSELMO, MURDOCH,
BURKE, PIPER & HOCHMAN, P.A.
Attorneys for Defendant, Town of Gulf Stream
2455 East Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 1000
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304
Telephone: (954) 463-0100
Facsimile: (954) 463-2444
By: Hudson C. Gill
JEFFREY L. HOCHMAN
Florida Bar Number 902098
HUDSON C. GILL
Florida Bar Number 15274
J. MARCOS MARTINEZ
Florida Bar Number 44573
10
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LAW OFFICES
JOHNSON, ANSELMO, MURDOCH, BURKE, PIPER & HOCHMAN, P.A.
A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
DAMIAN H. ALBERT, PA.
W. HAMPTON JOHNSON, IV
SCOTT D. ALEXANDER, PA
2455 EAST SUNRISE BOULEVARD
J. MARCOS MARTINEZ
MICHAEL T. BURKE
SUITE 1000
ROBERT E. MURDOCH
MELISSA BUTTON
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 37301
MICHAEL R. PIPER'
HUDSON C. GILL PA
DAVID M. SCHWEIGER, PA.
JEFFREY L. HOCHMAN, PA.
CHRISTOPHER L. SMITH
E. BRUCE JOHNSON •
(951) 483-0100 BMWard
CHRISTOPHER J. STEARNS, PA.
(305)946-2000 Dade
(561)6407445 WPB
Aerwci
TELECOPIER (554) 483-2444
RONALD P. ANSELMO
• ea.wo CFAVRWOtlL Harz uerm,
BURL F. GEORGE
February 16, 2015
Irma Cohen VIA EMAIL
Florida League of Cities
PO Box 538135
Orlando, FL 32853-8135
Re: Martin O'Boyle v. Town of Gulf Stream
Claim No.: GC2014077401
Our File No.: 00640/34107
Case No.: 13-ev-80317-DMM
Dear Ms. Cohen:
Enclosed please find a copy of the Motion for Summary Judgment that we filed on behalf
of the Town of Gulf Stream in the above -referenced matter.
The enclosure argues that the claim for declaratory relief was rendered moot earlier this year
when the Town repealed its original sign ordinance and replaced it with a new sign ordinance. The
enclosure also argues that the Court should reject the Plaintiff's First Amendment claim because the
Town's original sign ordinance was substantially related to a compelling Town interest and because
the Plaintiff cannot show that he suffered any actual damages.
If the Court were to agree with the Town's arguments, the Town's exposure to damages and
an adverse award of attorney's fees will be limited. However, if the Court approaches this case in
the manner suggested by our research, the Court is likely to find (1) that the original sign ordinance
failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard, (2) that application ofthe original sign ordinance violated
the Plaintiffs rights under the First Amendment, and (3) that a jury must decide the amount of
damages to be awarded to the Plaintiff.
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 1 of 19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: 9:14-cv-80317-DMM
MARTIN O'BOYLE,
Plaintiff,
VS.
TOWN OF GULF STREAM,
and WILLIAM THRASHER,
Defendants.
DEFENDANT, TOWN OF GULF STREAM'S, MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Defendant, TOWN OF GULF STREAM ("Town"), by and through its undersigned attorneys
and pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56. 1, moves for the entry of an
Order granting this Motion and entering final judgment in its favor with respect to all claims
asserted in the First Amended Complaint, DE 28, filed by Plaintiff, MARTIN E. O'BOYLE.'
I. MOTION
I. The pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and other
documents on file demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
Town is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to all claims in the First Amended Complaint.
2. The Town is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to the Plaintiffs
First Amendment claims seeking injunctive relief because those claim are now moot following the
Town's amendment of its Code of Ordinances pertaining to signs.
' The Defendant has filed a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment concurrently with this Motion. The "undisputed facts" upon
which this Motion is based are cited as (Facts $ _.).
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jurisdiction to entertain it." Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1328 (internal citations omitted). If lawsuit
is mooted by subsequent developments, any decision a federal court might render on the merits of
a case would constitute an advisory opinion. See jd Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336
(11 th Cir. 2001); Socialist Workers Party, 145 F.3d at 1244. A change in the law, such as amending
a zoning ordinance, or a change in other circumstances can give rise to mootness. Nat'l Adver. Co.,
402 F.3d at 1332. The Eleventh Circuit has held that "when a subsequent law brings the existing
controversy to an end the case becomes moot and should be treated accordingly." Coalition for the
Abolition on Mariivana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 219 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2000). In
other words, federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear and decide cases where changes in the law have
rendered the case moot. Nat'l Adver. Co., 402 F.3d at 1332.
Generally, a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is mooted by repeal of the statute.
In Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "when an
ordinance is repealed by the enactment of a superseding statute, then the 'superseding statute or
regulation moots a case only to the extent that it removes challenged features of the prior law."' 219
F.3d at 1310 (quoting Naturist Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (l lth Cir. 1992)).
Moreover, on numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has held that the repeal of or amendment to
challenged legislation rendered moot a plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. See e.g., Lewis v.
Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 474, 110 S. Ct. 1249,1252, 108 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1990) (holding that
a Commerce Clause -based challenge to Florida banking statutes was rendered moot by amendments
to the law); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 582-83, 109 S. Ct. 2633, 2637-38, 105 L. Ed.
2d 493 (1989) (holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot
by amendment to the statute); Princeton Univ. v. Schmjd, 455 U.S. 100, 103, 102 S. Ct. 867, 869,
70 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot
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Lewis, 494 U.S. at 474; Oakes, 491 U.S. at 582-83; Schmid, 455 U.S. at 103; Kremens, 431 U.S.
at 128-29; Diffenderfer, 404 U.S, at 415
Moreover, this is not a case where the Court may entertain a moot claim because the
situation is one that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d
1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004); Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. J.S. Tarwater Devel , 97
F.3d 492, 496 n.I (11th Cir. 1996) ("Even if the appeal would otherwise be moot, this case is an
appropriate one to decide on the merits because the challenged action is capable of repetition, yet
evading review."). With respect to an amended statute, it is only when a court is presented with
evidence of "substantial likelihood" that the challenged statute will be reenacted that the court may
find that the litigation is not moot. Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1329.
However, "governmental entities and officials have been given considerably more leeway
than private parties in the presumption that they are unlikely to resume illegal activities." Coral
Springs, 371 F.3d at 1328-29. Therefore, in the absence of evidence indicating that the government
intends to return to its prior legislative scheme, repeal of an allegedly offensive statute moots legal
challenges to the validity of that statute. Nat'l Adver. Co., 402 F.3d at 1332. "Whether the repeal
of a law will lead to a finding that the challenge to the law is moot depends most significantly on
whether the court is sufficiently convinced that the repealed law will not be brought back." Coral
Springs, 371 F.3d at 1331 (emphasis added).
Here, there is simply no evidence that the Town intends to return to its prior legislative
scheme as it pertained to signage. To the contrary, all of the record evidence indicates otherwise.
This is not the case where the Town merely removed the allegedly offending portions of the Old
Sign Code to avoid litigation. Rather, the Town passed an entirely New Sign Code, which
constituted a fundamental change from the past. It is beyond reasonable to conclude that the Town
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1. The Sections of the Old Sign Code
Applied to the Plaintiff are Constitutional
The first -step in evaluating the constitutionality of an ordinance which restrains protected
speech or expression is to determine whether the government is proscribing the speech because it
disfavors the message. Ward 491 U.S. at 791; Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d
1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005). "If the ordinance is a content -neutral time, place, and manner
restriction, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny — that is, it must not restrict speech substantially
more than necessary to further a legitimate government interest, and it must leave open adequate
alternative channels of communication." Id. "However, if the ordinance is content based, it is
subject to strict scrutiny, meaning that it is constitutional only if it constitutes the least restrictive
means of advancing a compelling government interest." Id. "As a general rule, laws that by their
terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views
expressed are content based." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2459, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994). "On the other hand, a content -neutral ordinance is one that places
no restrictions on ... either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter that may be discussed."
Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1259 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
Assuming arguendo that section 66-446(a)(5)d and section 66446(a)(5)a, of the Town's Old
Sign Code are subject to strict scrutiny, they remain constitutional. To pass strict scrutiny,
content -based regulations on non-commercial speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 120
S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2000); Cafe Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274,
1287 (11th Cir. 2004).
O'Boyle. See App. 11.
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pan8ntd-8nup ui oj!l;o Ai!lenb ayl 8utoueyu3„ u! lsoialw 8utlladwoa s,Xito 8utztu8o33u) (0661 '11D
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!ne pug lg8g alenbope ap!Aoid of [s138uep uaglo pue'slued'sig woij Alojes ainoas
of '•slaoils ayl w uopsa8uoo uossal of '.uuld luawdolanap antsuagaidwoo ayl ql!m
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 9 of 19
First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami -Dade County, 768 So. 2d 1114, 11 17 (Fla, 3d DCA 2000)
("Even assuming that the Church has demonstrated a substantial burden on its free exercise of
religion, the County clearly has a compelling interest in enacting and enforcing fair and reasonable
zoning regulations.") (citation omitted).
Moreover, the sections at issue from the Old Sign Code were narrowly tailored to meet this
compelling government interest. Here, the Old Sign Code's default setting was that all signs were
prohibited in the Town. See GULF STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66446(a) (repealed 2015) (The erection,
display and maintenance of a sign on any property or building with the town is prohibited....")
(emphasis added). This outright prohibition on signage within the Town was subject to a handful
of limited, narrowly -drawn exceptions, including "[s]igns placed or erected by governmental
agencies or nonprofit civic associations," GULF STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66-1 (repealed 2015), signs
required by the Town or other governmental agencies, GULF STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66-446(a)(1)
(repealed 2015), signs designating or naming a club, GULF STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66446(a)(2)
(repealed 2015), real estate signs, GULF STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66-446(a)(3) (repealed 2015), signs
identifying homes and streets, GULF STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66-446(a)(4) (repeated 2015), and
political signs, GuL-F STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66-446(a)(5) (repealed 2015). Each one of these was
[lien further narrowed by the test of the Old Sign Code. For example, "[s]igns placed or erected by
governmental agencies or nonprofit civic associations" were limited to those "for a public purpose
in the public interest." GULF STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66-1 (repeated 2015). Real estate signs were
also limited to placement on the private property to which the sign pertains. GULF STREAM, FLA.
CODE § 66-446(a)(3)(a) (repealed 2015). Real estate signs were further limited to less than two
square feet in area with white lettering and a black background. GULF STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66447
(repealed 2015).
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 11 of 19
than other signs. All other signs were restricted to a total area of two square feet. See GULF
STREAM, FLA. CODE § 66-447 (repealed 2015) ("Any other sign permitted herein shall not exceed
a dimension of two square feet."). By treating political speech more favorably, the Old Sign Code
satisfies the strict scrutiny test argued by the Plaintiff. For these reasons, the sections of the Old
Sign Code actually applied to the Plaintiff are constitutional, and the City is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law,
C. The Plaintiff is Limited to, at Most, Nominal Damages
The rule of law regarding the appropriateness of damages in § 1983 cases was set forth by
the Supreme Court in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106 S. Ct.
2537, 91 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1986). In that case, which involved a First Amendment violation, the Court
held that "damages based on the abstract 'value' or 'importance' of constitutional rights are not a
permissible element of compensatory damages" in § 1983 cases. Id., 477 U.S. at 310. In order for
the prevailing plaintiff to recover anything more than nominal damages in a § 1983 case, the
plaintiff must prove the existence of an actual, compensable injury resulting from the constitutional
violation. Id. see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978).
The injury may either be physical or can manifest itself as impairment of reputation, humiliation,
or mental and emotional distress. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307; Carey, 435 U.S. at 264. However,
whether physical or non-physical, the injury must be actual. Id.
Assuming arguendo that the Plaintiff could establish some as -applied First Amendment
violation, his damages are limited, at most, to nominal because he has failed to present any evidence
of an actual compensable injury in connection with the alleged constitutional violation. Here, the
Town first attempted to obtain the Plaintiff's claimed damages through paper discovery. The Town
propounded interrogatories upon the Plaintiff and specifically requested information relating to his
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 13 of 19
remains to be determined for the period that the signs were wrongfully removed An expert will be
consulted. -Money paid to Mark Dougan for aid in the running of the Plaintiff's campaign- $400.00,
- Attorney's Fees: Remains to be determined.").
As to the Town's request for information regarding intangible damages, the Plaintiff claimed
to have "feel[ings of] perscut[ion], humilat[ion], and betray[al] by his government," but objected
to providing information regarding any treatment by psychiatrists, psychologists, or other mental
health professionals asserting that such information was "irrelevant" as he sought only "`garden
variety' emotional damages." App. 13 at ¶ 7.
After the parties conferred in writing and verbally regarding the Plaintiffs answers, the
Plaintiff maintained his objection to providing any information regarding psychiatrists,
psychologists, or other mental health professionals,' but agreed to provide additional information
in response to Interrogatory 3. See App. 14. However, the Plaintiffs supplemental answer again
provided no actual evidence of the injuries caused by the allegedly unconstitutional removal of his
signs. See App. 14.
The Plaintiffs deposition testimony regarding his alleged injuries was similarly insufficient
to create a genuine issue of material fact. Initially, when asked to explain his damages, the Plaintiff
attempted to (again) put the issue off for another day. See App. 4 at 178-79 ("Q Okay. With
respect to question three, can you explain to me what'presumed damages' are? ... THE WITNESS:
The answer is, yes, I can, but I don't think that I can explain it right now. BY MR. GILL: Q Why
not? A Because I don't think that I could explain it right now. Q All right. So, I mean, this
' The Plaintiff maintained this objection during his deposition. See App. 4 at 180 ("Q
And you're not going to answer any questions of whether you sought any- any psychiatrist or
psychologist? ... THE WITNESS: I don't see a — I don't see any requirement or need for that."
13
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 15 of 19
there's a great deal of emotion leading up to and trying to win an election, and having a body politic
do everything they can to stop you and embarrass you and humiliate you, and it's distressing. And
it's also very stressful. And if you were in that boat, you would understand a whole lot more. Q
What does ostracized mean, in terms of damages? A Ostracized means that the Town made it so,
and Gulf Stream, that I have HIV. Q How did the Town do that? A I told you, the Civic
Association runs the town, 75 percent of the town, of the civic -- of the Town is run by the Civic
Association. The Civic Association includes the mayor's wife, I believe it includes the mayor.
They -- the Civic Association supported the others. The present commissioners made a statement
that if I were fortunate enough to be elected, they were all going to resign so that way there could
be no town commission."); at 183 ("Q What was the humiliation you referenced in terms of
damages? A It's -- it's humiliating to put your signs up -- I sometimes would put my signs up --
I had a bunch of them in my car and I would come home from work, and I would just keep going
down Al A and stop about every 50 feet and put signs. And then I would come back the other way
and put them, and they were already gone. They were all gone. Q On A 1 A? A On A] A, yeah.
They were all gone. Now, that's the Town. Did I see the Town do it, no. But that's the Town.")';
at 183-84 ("Q Okay. What's the damage to your dignity? A I think that my dignity is impaired
within the Town. As an example, my son and I walked into a commission meeting and Mr. Thrasher
was there with a woman, named Patsy Randolph, and the two of them were talking about how they
could keep Mr. O'Hare and Mr. O'Boyle from being allowed in the council chambers to see the town
meetings, in the Town where they both have millions invested. How do you like that?").
' The undisputed record evidence establishes that the Town did not remove any signs
from along A 1 A or North Ocean Boulevard. DE 14-I at ¶ 12.
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 17 of 19
risk of confusing the jury and causing prejudice. Contemporaneously with the filing of this Motion,
the Town has filed a motion asking that Abeam's unreliable and speculative "expert" opinion be
excluded. That separate Motion is incorporated herein by reference. Since Aheam's testimony is
inadmissable, it is insufficient to establish an actual injury resulting from the Town's conduct.
Finally, apart from the Plaintiffs deficient testimony and his improper expert report, the only
"evidence" of damages is his vague and speculative answers to the Town's interrogatories where
he claimed to have "feel[ings of] perscut[ion], humilat[ion], and betray[al] by his government." As
noted above, these types of "abstract 'value' or 'importance"' statements are not sufficient to
establish an actual injury. Accordingly, the Plaintiff is limited to, as a matter of law, nominal
damages. Makin v. Colorado Deo't of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 1999) (reversing
First Amendment damage award which was "based ... on the abstract value of the constitutional
right"); Malta v. Slagle. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67598,6-7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008) (finding that
although the restriction of the plaintiffs speech was a significant violation ofhis First Amendment
rights, it is well established that "damages based on the abstract 'value' or 'importance' of
constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in [§19g3] cases," and
that the plaintiff was only entitled to an award of S 1 in nominal damages.).
The Plaintiff was asked repeatedly to provide the information supporting the "actual injury'
component of his claim. His refusal to provide that information — in calculated fashion -- operates
to limit his claim, at most, to nominal damages.
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Case 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 59 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 19 of 19
SERVICE LIST
MARRETT WILLIS HANNA, ESQ.
COMMERCE GROUP, INC.
1280 West Newport Center Drive
Deerfield Beach, FL 33442
Attorney for Plaintiff
Phone: (954) 570-3718
Fax: (954) 360-0807
Email: f3mhanna a vahoo.com
RYAN L. WITMER, ESQ.
THE O'BOYLE LAW FIRM P.C.
1286 West Newport Center Drive
Deerfield Beach, FL 33442
Attorney for Plaintiff
Phone: (954) 574-6885
Email: rwitmerQobovlelawfirm.com
GIOVANI MESA, ESQ.
THE O'BOYLE LAW FIRM P.C.
1286 West Newport Center Drive
Deerfield Beach, FL 33442
Phone: (954) 574-6885
Email: RmesaCgoboylelawfinn.com
JOANNE M. O'CONNOR, ESQ.
JONES, FOSTER, JOHNSTON & STUBBS
505 South Flagler Drive
Suite 1100, P.o. Box 3475
West Palm Beach, FL 33402
Phone: (561) 659-3000
Fax: (561) 650-5300
Email: ioconnorgiones-foster.com
JEFFREY L. HOCHMAN, ESQUIRE
JOHNSON, ANSELMO, MURDOCH,
BURKE, PIPER & HOCHMAN, P.A.
2455 East Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 1000
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304
Attorneys for Defendants
Telephone: (954) 463-0100
Facsimile: (954) 463-2444
Email: Hochman@jambg.com
19
Case, 9:14-cv-80317-DMM Document 63-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/09/2015 Page 1 of 1
2950 North Andrews Avrnue, WHIM Manors, Fl, 33311
Michael G. Ahearn, Esq
1110001 to Present Michael G. Ahearn, PA
Wilton Manors, FL
Attorney/Owner
• Litigation Trial Attorney in mattersuch as Probate, Personal Injury, Small Claims, Traffic, and Commercial matters.
• Has tried numerous Criminal & Civil Trials- Jury and Bench Trials
• Represented client in excess of 1000 hearings in Trial Courts Statewide.
9-1-2003 to Present . Ahearn Disputc Resolutious (ADR) Wilton Manors, FL
Mediator/Arbitrator
• Court Approved Arbitrator 17" Judicial Circuit has presided as Arbitrator over 1200 Circuit and
County Court Civil matters
• Florida Supreme Court Certified
Mediator in such auras as Labor, CircuitCourt .Civil Mediator, has presided over 50 cases as a
Commercial, Probate and Personal Injury matter.
1-10 to Present Ahearn Consulting Wilton Manors, FL
Political Consultant
• Served as Campaign ConsultanUManager to School Board Member 2012 Katie Leach
Date Rom, Circuit Judge
• Served as Campaign Advisor to County Court Judge Edward Mcnigan, Circuit Court Judge
Tim Bailey, Circuit Court Judge Eileen O'Connor, Fart Lauderdale Mayor John P. Seiler.
Worked on various campaigns in diffemnt capacities from 1995 to present.
1994-1997 St Thomas University School Of Law
Juris Doctorate 1997 Miami, Florida
• Accepted as Member of the Florida (1997) and Federal Bar(1998)
References
References arc available on request.