HomeMy Public PortalAboutPRR 16-2275From: Chris O'Hare [mailto:chrisoharegulfstream@gmail.comj
Sent: Thursday, July 14, 2016 7:48 AM
To: Bill Thrasher <bthrasher@gulf-stream.org>; Rita Taylor <RTaylor@gulf-stream.org>
Subject: Public Record Request - RICO comm after after 6-21-16
Dear Custodian of Records,
I request to inspect certain public records for the purpose of informing myself of the historic and current
workings of the Town of Gulf Stream and its associated entities, vendors, consultants, advisers, contractors
and agents. The records I wish to inspect may be material to current, anticipated or presently unforeseen legal
action. In addition, inspection of these records is essential to my ability to make informed comments in an
upcoming public hearing. The production of any and all responsive records is therefore urgent and must be
acted upon in compliance with Florida Statutes and established case law as soon as possible.
Before making this public record request, I first searched online and in the public records portion of your
agency's website hoping I could locate the public records I seek without having to write you directly.
Unfortunately I cannot find the records I request to inspect.Therefore I am writing you now and requesting you
make every effort as required by law to produce these public records without delay.
I make this request pursuant to Article 1, Section 24 of the Florida Constitution and Chapter 119 of the Florida
Statutes. I hereby reserve all rights granted to me under the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes.
I ask that you take the following action:
• Read this entire request carefully and respond accordingly.
• If you are not the custodian of the public records described herein please determine who that person is
and notify me immediately in order that I may make this request to the appropriate person without
delay.
• Reference Florida Statutes and appropriate case law when responding to this record request.
• Do NOT produce any records other than records responsive to this request.
• Identify by name the person or persons responding to this request.
• Respond to this public record request in a singular manner and do not combine this request with any
other public record requests when responding to this request.
• Once you have determined that you do or don't have any records in your custody responsive to this
request, immediately act to obtain any responsive records that may be in the custody of
your contractor(s).
• Provide those records for inspection that do not require extensive use of information technologies or
extensive staff time or both in excess of 15 minutes and along with the production of those records
provide the cost for producing the balance of the responsive records.
As background to this request I call to your attention the dismissal of the Town's RICO complaint by
the Eleventh Circuit, filed 06/21-2016 in Case:15-13433. I also call to your attention a speech made by
Mayor Scott Morgan during the Town of Gulf Stream public meeting held July 8, 2016 in Town Hall
where Morgan stated:
I want to just give you an update on the litigation status. The RICO action is finished,...
I request to inspect the public record which is the earliest communication
between the Town and any entity which communication is related to the RICO
lawsuit and/or the RICO lawsuit appeal and which record was created after the
Eleventh Circuit's decision filed on June 20, 2016. The record I request to inspect
may include but not be limited to a record that was previously exempt from
inspection because of ongoing litigation which is now "finished" according to
Morgan.
FIRST PRODUCE RECORDS THAT DO NOT REQUIRE EXTENSIVE USE OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES OR EXTENSIVE STAFF TIME OR BOTH IN EXCESS OF 15 MINUTES AND ALONG
WITH THOSE RECORDS PROVIDE THE COST FOR PRODUCING THE BALANCE OF THE RESPONSIVE
RECORDS.
I ask you to take note of §119.07(1)(c) Florida Statues and your affirmative obligation to (1)
promptly acknowledge receipt of this public records request and (2) make a good faith effort which "includes
making reasonable efforts to determine from other officers or employees within the agency whether such a
record exists and, if so, the location at which the record can be accessed." I am, therefore, requesting that you
notify every individual and entity in possession of records that may be responsive to this public records request,
including individuals and entities under contract with your agency, to preserve and produce all responsive
records on an immediate basis.
If you contend that any of the records I am seeking, or any portion thereof, are exempt from inspection or
disclosure please cite the specific exemption as required by §119.07(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes and state in
writing and with particularity the basis for your conclusions as required by §119.07(1)(f) of the Florida Statutes.
Produce for my inspection all responsive records and ONLY redact that portion of the record that you consider
exempt. To be clear, if you consider an entire record to be exempt, produce that record in its entirety with all
portions redacted that you consider exempt. I specifically ask you to do this in order that I may inspect fully
redacted records for the purpose of challenging a particular redaction or establishing a reference for a future
request of a record that is only temporarily exempt, as in the case of a public record that was prepared by an
agency attorney exclusively for litigation and is only exempt from disclosure until the conclusion of the litigation.
I ask you to note that under §119.07(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes that a person who has custody of a public
record and who asserts that an exemption applies to a particular public record or part of such record shall
delete or excise from the record only that portion of the record with respect to which an exemption has been
asserted and validity applies, and such person shall produce the remainder of such record for inspection and
examination.
Again I ask that you provide only those records for inspection that do not require extensive use of information
technologies or extensive staff time or both in excess of 15 minutes. Take note of §119.07(4)(a)3.(d)
Florida Statues and if you anticipate that any records exist, the production for inspection of which will require
extensive use of information technologies or extensive staff time or both in excess of 15 minutes, then
please provide those records that can be produced within the first 15 minutes and advise me of the cost you
anticipate to be incurred by your agency for the remaining records prior to incurring this cost. Please do not
incur any costs on my behalf without first obtaining my written authorization to proceed. If you produce only a
portion of all existing responsive records, please tell me that your response includes only a portion of all
existing records responsive to this request.
If the public records being sought are maintained by your agency or contactors for your agency, In an electronic
format please produce the records in the original electronic format in which they were created or
received. See §119.01(2Hf), Florida Statutes.
If you anticipate the need to Incur any costs that I would be statutorily required to pay in order to inspect these
public records which would exceed $1.00 please notify me in advance of your incurring that cost with a written
estimate of the total cost. Please be sure to itemize any estimates so as to indicate the total number of pages
and/or records, as well as to distinguish the cost of labor and materials. Again, please do not incur any costs on
my behalf without first obtaining my written authorization to proceed.
A record that does not exist because of Its disposition requires the creation of a disposition record. In all
instances where you determine a record does not exist please determine if the record once existed and in its
replacement provide the disposition record for my inspection.
The term public records, as used herein, has the same meaning and scope as the definition of Public records
adopted by the Florida Legislature as 5119.011(12)of the Florida Statutes.
Please contact me at the email address shown below and request clarification if there is any part of this record
request you do not understand.
All responses to this public records request should be made In writing to the following email address:
chrisoharegulfttream@gmaii.com
TOWN OF GULF STREAM
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
Delivered via e-mail
July 15, 2016
Chris O'Hare [mail to: chrisohareeul£streamAemail.coml
Re: GS #2275 (RICO comm after after 6-21-16)
I request to inspect the public record which is the earliest communication between the Town and
any entity which communication is related to the RICO lawsuit and/or the RICO lawsuit appeal
and which record was created after the Eleventh Circuit's decision filed on June 20, 2016 The
record I request to inspect may include but not be limited to a record that was previously exempt
from inspection because of ongoing litigation which is now 'finished" according to Morgan.
Dear Chris O'Hare [mail to: chrisoharegulfstream(a4email.coml,
The Town of Gulf Stream has received your public records request dated July 14, 2016. The
original public record request can be found at the following link http://www2.gulf-
stream.org/weblink/o/doc/97384/Pagel.aspx.
Please be advised that the Town of Gulf Stream is currently working on a large number of
incoming public records requests. The Town will use its very best efforts to respond to you in a
reasonable amount of time with the appropriate response or an estimated cost to respond.
Sincerely, Town Clerk, Custodian of the Records
TOWN OF GULF STREAM
PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
Delivered via e-mail
August 17, 2016
Chris O'Hare [mail to: chrisohareeulfstream(Z gmail.com
Re: GS #2275 (RICO comm after after 6-21-16)
I request to inspect the public record which is the earliest communication between the Town and
any entity which communication is related to the RICO lawsuit and/or the RICO lawsuit appeal
and which record was created after the Eleventh Circuit's decision filed on Jame 20, 2016 The
record I request to inspect may include but not be limited to a record that was previously exempt
from inspection because of ongoing litigation which is now 'finished" according to Morgan.
Dear Chris O'Hare [mail to: chrisohareeulfstream(aa,email.coml,
The Town of Gulf Stream has received your original record requests dated July 15, 2016. Your
original public records request can be found at the following link:
http://www2.gulf-stream.ore/weblink/O/doc/97384/Pagel.asnx. Please refer to the referenced number
above with any future correspondence.
As an initial matter, your statement that records regarding the RICO lawsuit are no longer subject
to the work product exemption under the Public Records Act is incorrect. Indeed, the RICO suit
is not concluded for purposes of the Public Records Act because of your filing of post judgment
motions. See Wagner v. Orange Cty, 960 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5`h DCA 2007).
Next, the Town responds that your request for communications between the Town and "any
entity" is unclear. As a matter of courtesy, the Town understands your request to broadly define
the "Town" to include its outside counsel. The Town understands your request to seek
communications between the Town or its outside counsel and another person or entity. We also
understand your request to refer to the opinion issued by the Eleventh Circuit on June 21, 2016,
not June 20, 2016.
After expending 15 minutes of time, the Town has located the communication between its
outside counsel, which can be found at the same link above.
We consider this request closed.
Respectfully,
Town Clerk, Custodian of the Records
Case: 15-13433 Date Filed: 06/21/2016 Page: 1 of 13
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-13433
Non -Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 9:15-cv-80182-KAM
TOWN OF GULF STREAM,
a municipality organized and existing under the laws
of Florida on its own behalf and on behalf of those
municipalities similarly situated,
WANTMAN GROUP, INC.,
a domestic company on its own behalf
and on behalf of those companies similarly situated,
versus
MARTIN E. O'BOYLE,
an individual,
CHRISTOPHER O'HARE,
an individual,
WILLIAM RING,
an individual,
JONATHAN O'BOYLE,
an individual,
DENISE DEMARTINI,
an individual,
GIOVANI MESA,
an individual, et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
Case: 15-13433 Date Filed: 06/21/2016 Page: 2 of 13
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
(June 21, 2016)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Town of Gulf Stream, Florida ("Gulf Stream' or the "town") and its
contractor Wantman Group, Inc. ("Wantman") (collectively the "plaintiffs") appeal
the dismissal of their class action complaint' under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c). The
plaintiffs' complaint was premised on, among other actions, the defendants'
alleged efforts to inundate the town with public records requests in an attempt to
cause a violation of Florida's Public Records Act, Fla. Stat. § 119.07 (the "Act"),
and then to threaten litigation and the possibility of liability for attorneys' fees to
1 The plaintiffs defined the proposed class to include the following:
All state or local municipalities, municipal agencies, or private contractors in the
State of Florida, who have been served with a public records request by any of the
Defendants and who either (a) paid a settlement amount in conjunction with, or to
resolve the public records request; or (b) incurred attorneys' fees and costs to
respond to or litigate against public records requests from any of the Defendants.
Compl. ¶ 31, Doc. 1. Citations to "Doc." refer to docket entries in the district court record in this
case.
Case: 15-13433 Date Filed: 06/21/2016 Page: 3 of 13
extort an unreasonable settlement. The district court recognized the "very difficult
situation" the plaintiffs allegedly found themselves in, Doc. 47 at 4, but
nevertheless held that the plaintiffs failed to allege at least two predicate acts in
support of their RICO claim. After careful review, we agree that the plaintiffs'
allegations, although troubling, fail to state a claim under RICO. Therefore, we
Fl ra"491
I.
Gulf Stream is a tiny town of under 1,000 residents and just 17 full time
employees .2 The defendants—Martin E. O'Boyle, William F. Ring, Christopher
O'Hare, Jonathan R. O'Boyle, Denise DeMartini, and their associated
companies—pummeled the town with nearly 2,000 public records requests, many
of them frivolous, with no intention of actually reviewing the results. Examples of
such requests included
• "All email addresses created or received by the Town of Gulf
Stream," Compl. Ex. B, Doc. 4-2 at 2 (No. 1);
• "All phone numbers in the town's records," id. (No.3); and
• "Any and all records containing a social security number," id. at
10, No. 322.
' We derive these facts from the complaint's well -pled allegations, which we accept as
true for purposes of the motions to dismiss. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
1335 (11 th Cir. 2012).
3
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These and other bogus requests were "an essential first -step" in a "scheme to
defraud and extort money from the class members." Compl. ¶ 37, Doc. 1.
The purpose of this onslaught of records requests was to induce a violation
of the Act and then threaten a lawsuit, or actually file one, which could entitle the
defendants to prevailing party attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 119.12 .3 "It is this
threat of prevailing party attorneys' fees," the plaintiffs alleged, "that is the nucleus
around which the Defendants created their scheme to defraud and extort, and
organized their RICO Enterprise to carry out that scheme." Compl. ¶ 52, Doc. 1.
The defendants then demanded unreasonable settlements and threatened to file
more frivolous records requests if the town did not settle the claims. Since 2013,
the defendants have filed 43 public records suits against the town.4
3 Florida Statutes § 119.12 provides:
If a civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the provisions of this chapter
and if the court determines that such agency unlawfully refused to permit a public
record to be inspected or copied, the court shall assess and award, against the
agency responsible, the reasonable costs of enforcement including reasonable
attorneys' fees.
Fla. Stat. § 119.12.
4 In addition to the public records disputes litigated in state court, Martin O'Boyle and the
town have had other disagreements, some of which have been litigated in federal court. See, e.g.,
O'Boyle v. Thrasher, Ward, & Town of Gulf Stream, No. 15-10997,_F. App'x _ 2016 WL
158757 (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2016) (affirming the district court's dismissal of O'Boyle's claims
against the town under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); O'Boyle v. Town of Gulf Stream, et al., No. 9:14-cv-
80317-DMM (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2015) (granting the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment
and dismissing a First Amendment challenge to the town's sign ordinance), appeal docketed, No.
15-13964 (11th Cir. Sept. 3, 2015). We recently affirmed the award of attorneys' fees in the
Case: 15-13433 Date Filed: 06/21/2016 Page: 5 of 13
In addition, defendant O'Hare employed aliases when making public records
requests to avoid incurring a special service charge the town would have otherwise
imposed. Florida authorizes the town to condition public records production on the
payment of certain costs and expenses, but only "[i]f the nature or volume of
public records requested to be inspected or copied ... is such as to require
extensive use of information technology resources or extensive clerical or
supervisory assistance by personnel of the agency involved, or both." Fla. Stat.
§ I I9.07(4)(d). When the town began to assess special service charges against
O'Hare for his voluminous requests, he started using fake names to hide his
identity.
The defendants also lodged a bogus public records request with Wantman, a
government contractor also covered by the Act. See Fla. Stat. § 119.070 L' When
the defendants did not receive the document requested, they filed suit and promptly
demanded nearly $4,000 to settle the claim.
§ 1983 action. O'Boyle v. Thrasher, Ward & Town of Gut(Streanz, No. 15-10997, _ F. App'x
_, 2016 WL 1426013 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 2016).
During the relevant time, Fla. Stat. § 119.0701(2) (2003) provided that "each public
agency contract for services must include a provision that requires the contractor to comply with
public records laws." Florida recently amended this statute to specify precisely when a public
records requester may bring suit against a contractor. See 2016 Fla. Law Serv. ch. 2016-20
(CS/HB 273) (codified at Fla. Stat. § 119.0701(3)-(4) (2016)).
9
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Based on these and similar allegations, the plaintiffs filed a class action
complaint on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly situated state or
local municipalities, municipal agencies, or private contractors. They alleged that
each defendant committed at least one predicate act of mail fraud, wire fraud, or
extortion, constituting a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of RICO, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c). The defendants moved to dismiss arguing, among
other points, that neither filing frivolous public records requests nor threatening to
file or actually filing a lawsuit is a predicate act under RICO. The district court
agreed, granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, and dismissed the case with
prejudice. This appeal followed.
"We review de novo the district court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the complaint's allegations as true
and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff" Chaparro v.
Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). A "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twwrzbly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). A complaint is insufficient if it "tenders naked assertions devoid
of further factual enhancement." Id. (internal quotations marks and citation
0
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omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead "factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Id.
To establish a federal civil RICO violation under §§ 1962(c) and 1964(c),
the plaintiffs must prove the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity and an injury to business or property by reason of the RICO
enterprise. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1282-83 (11th
Cir. 2006). The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' RICO claim on the ground
that the plaintiffs failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity. We therefore
focus on this element of the claim.
A RICO "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two "qualifying
predicate acts," each of which constitutes "a violation of one of the state or federal
laws described in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)." Raney v. Allstate Lis. Co., 370 F.3d 1086,
1087 (11th Cir. 2004). The plaintiffs argue that they have adequately pled two
types of predicate acts: (1) extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and
(2) mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)
(listing violations of the Hobbs Act and the mail and wire fraud statutes). We
consider each type of predicate act in turn.
7
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ra
The Hobbs Act prohibits extortion, defined as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants' "systematic use of unjustified lawsuits
as part of a more extensive extortion scheme to obtain money" supports a claim of
extortion under the Hobbs Act. Appellants' Br. at 18. Our precedent commands
otherwise.
We held in United States v. Pendergraft that a "threat to file litigation
against [the government], even if made in bad faith and supported by false
affidavits, [was] not `wrongful' within the meaning of the Hobbs Act." 297 F.3d
1198, 1208 (11th Cir. 2002). The issue was whether a threat to add a bogus claim
in a federal lawsuit against a county government in an effort to force a large
settlement could support a Hobbs Act violation. "[U]nder our system," we
explained, "parties are encouraged to resort to courts for the redress of wrongs and
the enforcement of rights." Id. at 1206. Thus, "litigants may be sanctioned for
only the most frivolous of actions." Id. And even then, such sanctions—through
tort actions for malicious prosecution, for example—"are heavily disfavored." Id.
We also expressed confidence in the "time -tested procedures" of the courts to
resolve disputes in litigation by "separating validity from invalidity, honesty from
M
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dishonesty." Id. Moreover, citizens have a constitutional right to petition the
government for redress under the First Amendment. Id. at 1207. For these
reasons, we rejected the contention that a threat to file litigation against the
government can trigger Hobbs Act liability. Id. at 1206-1207.
We clarified in Raney, a civil RICO case, that Pendergraft applies both to
threats of litigation and actual litigation. Raney, 370 F.3d at 1088. In Raney, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants filed frivolous lawsuits in an effort to extort
money from him. Id. at 1087. We held unequivocally that "the filing of a lawsuit
may not state a claim for extortion under the federal RICO statutes." Id.
The material difference between this case and Pendergraft or Raney is the
number of times the defendants allegedly threatened to file a lawsuit or actually
sued in an effort to extort money. Indeed, assuming the allegations in the
complaint are true, as we must, the defendants have engaged in a pattern of
frivolous litigation activity while abusing, on a grand scale, their statutory right to
request public documents from the government. Nonetheless, the same concerns
driving our decisions in Pendergraft and Raney are equally present here. Our
judicial system, and the Act in particular, encourages citizens to use the courts to
resolve public records disputes. Moreover, citizens have a constitutional right to
petition the government for redress. We believe that regardless of the scope and
scale of the litigation, the courts are amply equipped to deal with frivolous
9
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litigation. See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 741, 749 (Fla. 2005)
(sanctioning an attorney for, among other things, "repeatedly attempt[ing] to
relitigate the same nonmeritorious issue in an attempt to frustrate the legal process
and to harass [an] attorney debt -collector"). Thus, Pendergraft and Raney control,
and the alleged misconduct cannot as a matter of law constitute the predicate act of
extortion for purposes of the plaintiffs' civil RICO claim.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants abused their right to request
public records; they argue on appeal that this abuse amounted to a RICO predicate
act. As alleged in the complaint, the defendants intentionally set the town up to
violate the Act. Whether it was a setup or not, the town may be on the hook for
attorneys' fees if it failed to respond timely to the requests. See Bd. of Trustees,
Jacksonville Police & Fire Pension Find v. Lee, 189 So. 3d 120, 124-25 (Fla.
2016) (holding that once the court determines that the defendant "unlawfully
refused" to permit a public record to be inspected or copied, the court must assess
reasonable attorneys' fees, whether or not the defendant acted in good faith (citing
Fla. Stat. § 119.12)); Promenade D'Iberville, LLC v. Sundy, 145 So. 3d 980, 983
(Fla. 1 st DCA 2014) (holding that a delay in producing non-exempt public records
for no legally sufficient reason constitutes a violation of the Public Records Act).
We nevertheless agree with the district court that the alleged abuse of the Act
"must be addressed in the individual lawsuits filed, or through a change in the laws
10
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by the Florida Legislature." Doc. 47 at 8. RICO and the Hobbs Act in particular
do not provide the remedy the plaintiffs seek.
91
The plaintiffs next contend that mail and wire fraud constitute the predicate
acts necessary to support their RICO claim. Specifically, they argue that O'Hare's
use of aliases to avoid incurring a special service charge when lodging public
records requests amounted to fraud. We are unpersauded.
"The elements of mail and wire fraud are: (1) intentional participation in a
scheme to defraud, and, (2) the use of the interstate mails or wires in furtherance of
that scheme." United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009).
"Nondisclosure of material information can constitute a violation of the mail and
wire fraud statutes where a defendant has a duty to disclose, either by statute or
otherwise." McCulloch v. PNC Bank Inc., 298 F.3d 1217, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002);
accord Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 Fad 1043, 1065 (11th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the failure to allege a duty to disclose is fatal to a RICO claim
premised on mail fraud arising out of alleged nondisclosure of material
information).
Although the plaintiffs argue that O'Hare's concealment of his true identity
to avoid incurring a special service charge constituted fraud, they alleged no facts
to plausibly suggest that O'Hare had any duty to disclose that information. To the
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contrary, Florida law recognizes a person's right to request public records
anonymously. See Chandler v. City of Greenacres, 140 So. 3d 1080, 1084-85 (Fla.
4th DCA 2014) (holding that a city cannot require a public records requester to
provide identifying information, which "could have a chilling effect on access to
public records and is not required by the Public Records Act"). Accordingly, the
plaintiffs failed to allege the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud to support their
RICO claim. Because we conclude that the plaintiffs' snail and wire fraud
allegations fail on this basis,6 we do not consider the defendants' alternative
reasons for rejecting it.
IV.
The allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint paint a frustrating picture.
Accepting those allegations as true, the defendants have engaged in a concerted
effort to capitalize on the relatively unfettered access to public records Florida has
granted its citizens by bombarding small towns and municipalities with public
records requests to which they cannot respond adequately. As distasteful as this
6 Sce Thanes v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) ("We may
affirm the district court's judgment on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that
ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below.").
12
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conduct may be, the allegations do not support a RICO claim under our precedent.
We therefore affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.
AFFIRMED.
7 Some of the defendants have also filed a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38. We DENY that motion.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ELBEBT PARR TITTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUIL DENG
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georlpa 30303
David 1. Smith
Clerk of Caurt
June 21. 2016
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES
Appeal Number: 15 -13433 -DD
Case Style: Town of Gulf Stream, et al v. Martin O'Boyle, et al
District Court Docket No: 9:15-cv-80182-KAM
For roles and fame,nit
Cal L.Kou '.env
This Court requires all counsel to file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF")
system, unless exempted for good cause. Enclosed is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal.
Judgment has this day been entered pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in
accordance with FRAP 41(b).
The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 1 lth Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for filing a petition for
rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings,
a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time
specified in the rules. Costs are governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a
motion for attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.
Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested Persons a complete list
of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by any party in the appeal. See l lth Cir. R. 26.1-
1. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition
for rehearing en banc. See 11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 .
Counsel appointed under the CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT must file a CIA voucher claiming compensation for time
spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a
petition for a writ of certiorari (whichever is later).
Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 39, costs taxed against appellants.
The Bill of Costs form is available on the internet at www.cal l.uscourts.gov
For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number referenced in the signature
block below. For all other questions, please call Elora Jackson. DD at (404) 335-6173.
Sincerely,
DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court
Reply to: Jeff R. Patch
Phone #: 404-335-6161
OPIN-I A Issuance of Opinion With Costs